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I-PRODUCTION
From 5, France was joined to the Let
Union in a Pact utusl itanc . rem June, 6,
11 the War, the Commiini~t Party had seventy-two
in the French Chamber. rem the time
'
ecarae Chancel-




- laion Pact with any which i 1 the
we 7 I. «Tunc , 3 , France su: o
many,
T. THE PROBLEM
are the fact<s of the late 1930* s. On the fsce
of It, it would appear that France had declined from tl
raramoi:: war on the Continent of Eurt
to one of r iefea . ad the French Com-
munist Party, as a tool t t foreign j , >een
rer l\ ate of affairs': To he more exnlic
did the Fr- et Par ce the course of French
hirini is thesis will attem;
to answer that quest ioi .
the ! know! ;e of this writer, th on
has nev ^n treated in any single worl . "rue, there are

2works on the French Communist Party $mt as there are works
French histor^ durinp the period end ample coverafe of
French and Soviet foreipn relations. Bus es to en assessment
of the role played by the French Communist Party in influ-
enr he foreijm policy of the French Government, there is
a distinct gar. "his thesis will attempt to help fill t
void.
There is one aspect of the area under study which is
side the scope of this thesis. attempt will he atade
to create a theory or system as to what the French Commmi
Party real Iv wanted despite what they stated publicly to be
their policy. This work will rely solely on the public
1 icy of the Party.
n. t» ?HO0 OF FEOCEDllI
This study Hill present the problem by comparinr the
answers to two nuesticns. First, wl i the French Com-
munist Party we^t Is French fersigs policy? And secondly,
what was?, in fact, the position or course of action taken
by the French Government From the differences, if any, of
these two, we can draw our cone mi as to whether the
French Communist Party had any influence, end perhaps, w*
The sources of this thesis will consist of the
periodicals and other publics^ f the Frer mmunist
Party during the period in question as well as the coalmen- .
taries of non-communist observers. To this, the official
record of the French Parliament, recognised histories cf

3Prance, the inter-war period, and of the fcrei iicy of
the Soviet Onion have been compared. should be noted
here that translations of French works quoted herein were
made by this author unless the wor*- cited is an English
translation.
This study will begin with the Paris rots of
February 6, 1934, a convenient date to begi? use it was
a milestone in the growing influence of the French Communist
Party and because it was during the year 1934 tl viet
Russia entered the community of nations and became a more
active rpiticipant in traditional international politics.
The date is equally useful in that it precedes II C
press of the Ccmintern at which the new program of the
People's Front was *dven its formal Mess : . And finally,
by 1934 the French Communist Party was the only Ceiamuni
Party outside the Soviet Union which was neither illegal nor
lltl ficant,
The study continues until September 26, 1939, the
date on which the French Communist Party was banned I
d ~ . By this time, France had adopted a firm posi-
tion with regard to both Germany and the fcvie' he
was at war with ore and iaed the ether. The effect of
the French Communist Party on the French Government duri
the immc i ten months of war which followed would be
other si — that of an underground activity inside a
nation at war. f% the period betweer fall of
France in June 1940 and Hitler* s invasion of Russia on

kM tt| I941i is completely different as is the period from
June 22, 1941 i tc the present.
The period of this stu hen, is confined to those
five end ore-half ye cies of
France, Great Britain, Italy, the Soviet Union and,
particular, Germany led the world Intc m r and most
devastating war*
III. FRANCE AND THE COT
The period under study is a strange mixture of
ces: the policies of Onion with regard to
Germany in particular, Ilia policies of the French Government,
also in regard to Germany in particular, and the polie
the French Communist Party acting in Its role as member of
the Communist International and as I " of • vlet
Government. This study will attempt to show that the French
Communist Perty did e*©rt an influence on the actions or the
inaction of the French Government during these critical
years but that this influence was not the determiner" factor
of French foreign policy nor was the influence of the French
Communist Par sltlve, but rather the influence was nega-
tive . In other words, the French Communist Party never
succeeded in imposing its desires in a single major foreign
policy decision of the era. On the other hand, some deci-
sions were taken despite— erhaps to spite— the French
Communist Party. If the Communists were in fa or of a
certain course of action, then in most cases aff<. he

security of France, the centre} of Germany, T taly or the
the French CTCvei-nment would choose the c -
site course of action* If the Communists were in agreement
with the Government, then the course of action was susre
had to be wrcr.r. Generally, whatever the Communists wanted,
I rot get.
the author is tempted to ask himself if the fore
icy of France would net have teen much different durir.
this period if it were not for the presence, the sire and
the power of the French Communist Party. e answer seer
to be yes, hut this is not to say that the Communists were
to blame for the policies which led to the utter defeat of
France. Far from it. The prime culpr the i seems
to be the unhappy political, social and economic straits net
only of France, but of most of the industrial! red world.
This culprit led to the Fascist regime in Italy and the
arir.&tion of political thought in Germany, Spain and
France in the twenties and thirties. In France, the search
for drastic remedies ^ave birth to or revitalized such or .-a: -
izatior.s as I. * Action Francelse (Fascist oriented Poyalists
and Catholic^, the Croix de Feu of Colonel de la ccque
(somewhat Nasi), the French Popular Party of ex-Communist
Jacques Doriot (definitely pro-Nazi), and the vitriolic
French Communist Far 1
cial &nd economic strife was rampant in the 's.
en the United States was not free from it. Americans ha
their Huey Lot
,
illiam Lemke, Earl Browder, Father Cough!

Iend Doctcr 3end. Happily, iti the United States no ex-
treme meesi- f fascism or communism were taker. ' i-.\ the
Communist Party of the United States held seventy-two seats
in the Ccnrress, the Mew Deal propram *.'ould, mo- 3ly»
never have teen enacted simplv because that prorram would
have been supported by the Communists and therefore regarded
bv the conservatives and moderates as 'soiling cut to
Russia. But because the Communist Party was not a threat to
the United Ctates, Roosevelt's program could te enacted
without the majority cf Americans fsarJnr a surrender to
communism.
Viewed in this light, the foreign policies of the
Lrd French Republic misfct have been different had it not
•a for the Franc -nmunist Party, lut not entire!
different. The social, economic and political
France in period would still have caused a polarization
Trench roll tics to both extrenv the spoo-
OMU The French cabinets would still bs e been shaky.
other scapegoat would have been found to replace th Is
of the French Coaour.iet Party. ted interests of the
Rirht and Left would have caused pressures not, i- best
interests of the Republic. The French mist Party was
a most convenient and vulnerable scapegoat. It had a recc
for feting unr tic despite its volte-face -1935.
Communists had been ardent pacifist a althoi had
r reached revolution in matters domestic m cated a

?ovemmen^ ''ney could net erase their rapttta-
n for beirr the Instrument of a foreim power.
/anient scapfteoat" i» therefore perhaps the best
label to describe the French Communist Party during these
years. Be it a strike or a riot, the Communists could be
blamed. If the Communists were In favor of stron.*- action by
the League of Nations, the Right could claim that the Com-
munis ta were unpatriotic. * the Communists were in favor
of strong action against Italy durinr the Abyssinian War,
then the Centre could believe the charge of "war rs"
emena' from the rre- Italian newspapers* If the Fre-
Communists were in favor of a strong France- al
Assistance Pact, then such a pact had to be watered down md
eat permitted to be too effective lest perhaps the Communist
Part*/ pain a feather for tti cap, cr the Republic become too
involved with the Tl&d Menace* the bast way for energies
the Communist Party to handle the situation was to trv to
the pact, subject it to an unusual process of ratifi-
cation and then virtually forget about it. This was dona.
When Germany, the arch-enemy of Franca, militerlr
the Rhineland in vie? at ion of the Treaties of Versailles and
Locarno, and the French Government actually lacked the w
to do aomethinr about it. then a convenient excuse was to
remain ins; because action would please the Communists
and the Fovlet Union. If ( c of Spain
under ettaei by rebels, aided by foreign and fa-
^rnments, action to assist the constituted £overnaant was

evirtually impossible because the Communists and the Soviet
t^nion are in sympathy with the can povemae?
By the late ij France had set u§ a patterr of
lowing the lead of Great Britain. Austria was annexe .
Czechoslovakia was e^ wished. The French Communist Party
was against these actions, the : cviet Union protest ,
Until the end of , a French C 1st Party
urged the defense of Poland. Here, for once, the French
Government and the Party agreed, But the Soviet t'nicn had
decided by this time to make ether plans, and to make the
score o agreement between the Part I the French
C-cvernaent almost perfect , the Party reversed itself in mid-
t ember, 1939, end denounced France's defense of the * arti-
Holish state.
There were other ^ery import art influences en French
forei ;icy between 1934 and 1939. Great Britain was a
prime influence. As a matter of historical fact, France
followed in the wa>e of British policy from the sanctions
-
jinst Italy throurh to the declaration of war against
Germany. , France was exactly three hours
behind in Britain's waVe. But here too, the influence of
the French Communist Party was reflected: Tory distrust and
suspicion of the Popular Front, Communist activities
ain, and the anti-eppease?ment attitude of the French
Communis
Germany was a prime object and, in a very real sense,
a motivate finance en French forei Hey. Diplomatic

novas and intense propaganda by Germany had their effect.
, tha French Communist Party was a prime target for
na^anda and once again a C lent scapegoat.
Even the United States wa3 an influence althox
primarily a negative one. Had the United states chosen
olve itself in the problems of Europe, seme frenchmen
habitually in the Centre mi^ht nc re feared Russia and
ism so rrruch snd mifht not have been attracted 30
strong!v to fascism as *the wave of the future.
France lacked trusted and strong leaders at this
tins In her history. "Shore was no Clemenceau or Poincare.
Im' rty leaders vara generally unVnown outside
their own party. Fver. ' s, Pierre Laval was noted
fcr being r's' , ' Leon Blum, while sincere, lacked force.
T^aladier had a reputation for he:- 'strong man." Chau-
tempa, Fir arrsut never enjoyed wide confidence.
Inerein lies another contrifcx factor.
The French Communist Party was an influence, then,
but not tl I cr determining influence, on French foreign
relations & this period. Sks mode or manner of influ-
ence was to cause the \ overnment to be more appeasing
toward Germany f deal toward the Soviet ITnicn
than would have been the case had there been a French Com-
'st Party of bl« strc That pre; ' or^. will




From the Paris riots of early 1934 to the occurati
rhe demilitarised rone of the Rhinslend by German I
in Karch,
,
the world witnessed g change of outlock on
world affairs by the Soviet Union and the bef.nnings of the
ie of German military night « It was q\ this od
that Musaclini embsrlcad on his conquest oi in a
manner reminiscent of nineteenth century colonial . The
security of Europe could have bean j vndly cted 1
the agreement between viet Union and France, the
franc iet Pact of 1935* But because of the nature of
the . nicn and the birth of the Popular Front in
France, this pact was not taken as seriously by the French




In Paris, on the ev of February 6, 1934, a r
brcVe out on th«* Place de la Concord . Fourteen rioters
I I one rciicamar. were billed and 1,350 if
ri cross the bri fee the Chamber of Deputies
where Edouard Daladier, Premier for less than a weeV, had
been howled down repeatedly that day by the t and

11
Communist Deputies when he presented hi3 new cabinet. 1 The
cause of the riot seems to have been the escalation of a
protest demon strati or roups ov, | Stavisky
scandal' and rumors of a ccr the Daladier government,
the riot was neither Communist inspired nor a Fascist, plot.-*
Franz Borkenau calls : t OSS of t ny convulsions shaVI
Europe in the wake of Hitler's advent ^c power. " The er : -
sode resulted in ferll down the Daladier fe t.
was not tiie riot, however oh was significant, but the
consequences of it which became most important in the course
of French polities in the years which followed. For the




, SrjffiSfi Since 1789 (Jlew York: Harper
and P.cw, Publisher j"» P* 3 3.
5
' lexandre Stgfltky was a financial a :urer
who had engaged Is many and varied schemes of dubious or cut-
ri- actor* After his arrest in la .-cemfcer,
r set ons with leading j I : clans, high ri-
mer" police &av« rise to a stora of protest.
/fter sacs* from <: lyf he was found dead with a bullet
in hi f #, . The re lice reported it. as a
suicide* but the rumor was that the police had purposely
silenced him. See "filliam L. Shirer century Jourcej f^ew
York: Farrar, Straws ar , 195?)T PP» £^/,Tbr a
shcr' I account.
exsnder ' m Twilight g|
ed. with an Introduction by D.~ ." hrogas (!iew~"YT
and Brothers, 1942), p. IS* This is to be construed a®
a denial that the leadership of the Rightist demonstrate.
was attempting convince the world that the Republic •
co: Ion [the Stavisky affair] were one and th e.
Indeed, Co.. la Rocque ? s Feu de Croix raladier
to be tec far to the loft , cee I , G£. cit. , r .
^Frar- Borksnsu, Europe namunlsta (New Yc
Harrer j rcthers, ), p. 11 "this work has excellent




t French Coanuni3t Partv W8s born at Tours en
Pecember , .. There, at thr teenth Ccnpress of the
French : ccialist Party (Section francaisa de 1* internet ionsle
cuvriere, . . . (.), the ates voted to $•! the Third
Internattonal by the vote n favor while Leon Blua's
rroup could r as to reject the Twentv-one
Conditions. 5 Until the mid-1930 1 s, the French Communist
Partv ws a significant force lit hone or a 1 real. Tb
csapaipned against the French occupation of tfl \r in 1923i
succeeded in winning tea and twenty-five seats in
the French Chsaber of Deputies in 1924, the year of the vie-
rcrv of the Cartel dea Oauches.^ However, disputes within
the party itself as well as changes in tactics dictated by
the Comintern caused the Communists in I92£ to lose thirteen
of their twenty- five seats while ricking up only two addi-
tional seats frea Alsace. Xndu.l in left extremist,
party shouted slogans of class a£&iaat class, insulted the
democrat c Socialists a ---cisl-fsscists,' and cor
esllsd fYr a reneral striVe by trade unionists whoa the
'Jaccues Fauvet, H* re du. Parti Coaauniste Fran-
cais (Evrer - ihrairie ArthFse Fayard, . I, p.
3Xt was an indisp*
period. :ves considerable background on tb roonnel
and of the French Communist Party but it is not
definitiv the influence exercised by the Party en French
Ions.
BorVenat., c£. clt
. , p. Ifi -
id
. , p. .

13
dii net control. Tn the elections of 1932, the Party, with
en]-
,
members, lost four of its fourteen seats in the
Chamber. Communist Deputies and crowds alike carried on a
program of m I -cooperation with, and animosity towards, any
ornment in power. Their foreign policy was likewise C
of simple negation. They ware net only anti-j a trio tic, but
the French Communists ' seemed to detest French patriotism
9 _
T?ore than any other patriotism. rr They rejected any su-
ggestion to form a United Front with the Socialist . ' Les
lets partcut ! was their most consistent slogan
•
After the rlpta of February 6, Daladier resigned the
following day under threat, of renewed ric . The Presi-
dent of the Republic, . lebrum, called the elder statesman,
Gaston Dcumergue, who was himself a former President, to
form a government.. ' new national government was
accepted by all principal factions except the Jccialists,
Communists, a htist Action Franchise .
On February 7 the C.n. n . {Confederation General e du
Travail) had called for a general str'ke v on
February 12 under the sponsorship cf the ~. V . tself, the
Bts and the Lime dea Droit 9 de I_ §« I Commun-
ists, aetinp separately, called for a protest rally at the
9Tves P.. Simon, Jfe* Road to Vichy „_L_-^_ : rans.
James A. Corbett and Decree «J* rrbw ( New YeH- : ^heed
and Ward, 1942), p. 142.
lcGa/-ncr
, g£* pit . , p* 3"3.

14
Place de la lioue for February >. Disregarding a
police pro! on, tile Communist-led demonstration went
ahead with full anti-fascist fury and shouts i
Daladier and ex-Intericr Minister Eugene Frot ra&l out alonp
with Dissolve the fascist leagues p and Down v\" he
reactionary and fftftftlct * sticnal Union of the Hedlcals and
i! As for the general strike on February 12,
the French Communists decided to .loin. 2 the day of t!
strike, cialists and Communists mm *F
in ^IneeRnes. Despite attempts by the leaders of the Com-
as well aa the Socialists, C.G.T. and C. . r .0. (the
riHimilliTnr triented Confederation Generale du Travail t !r>i-
taire) to segregate their respective forces, the working
class part nts vers, la fact, forming their owr. spon-
taneous United Front. The i this time were "Unity of
Action. iv> 'Hie Popular Front of the left was fores
not on Communist initiative. Indeed, on April 1$, urice
Thcrez, Secretary of the French Communist Party, wrote in
lFauret, gg« cit . , '• 136.
12
rV.enau reports on the basis of a confidential
?e that the Comintern representative In Peris, a Pole
Irown as Pried e made the decisi.
.
participate without
first c< • % Moscow. L'HttBapfrti ed" tor , t $x4 Marty,
disagreed and refused to print the party's appeal for par-
ticipation in that newspaper. See BorVenau, cr,. c'l . , p.
33 Fauvet, o£. cit . , r. 13?.
^Thcres was born on April 2: , I9Q0j 18 ' 'cyellea-
iault, a small village in the Pas-de-Calais, near the
•-lish Channel. The son and grandson of coal miners,
went to work in the mines at the age of twelve. As a yci*

Humanlte that naU gossip ftfesttt a marriare between Coamu -
ists end ?cci; g ftmdaasfet&lly ftj In the spirit, of
im.
'
Rut in Moscow, the situation was viewed in another
light, CoMiaunists Is China and in Germany had learned by
blood and torture that the I of the twentieth century
was not so easy to overthrow as the crumbling Taari
regime.^ scow war for a shift in policy made
necessary by events in Oenaar.y.
II. Liwisof . ran
On January 3 . 33 » Hitler had become Che-' of
Germany. Rut since Hitler was hostile to the West, he was
considered to he of possible usefulness to Moscow. Only a
Seraaay fv: t to the ~ersai3 I s would be con-
sidered a danger to the ' ovist regime. But during 1934,
relations between the two states deteriorated. On January
, Poland signed a ron-aggression pact with Germany.
scow, this was erroneously viewed as a Jiitler-Pilsudsfci
wan, he joined tb -iaUst Party, later became one of the
founding members of the French Communist Party in 192Q,
became secretary of the Socialist Federation of Fas-de-Galai?
in K'23, thai f the Political bureau of the Perty
in 1927. Ir ' •, h& became Secretary of the ^arty and was
elected to the Chamber of Deputies two years later. See hio
obituary in the S*w York Times , July 12, 1964, and Fauvet,
cp. cit
. , p, ft st tassia .
VKunanite, pttl 13, 1934.
~
n
» ££• £it. , r. ?l

Pact against Russia, ^dually, the new German lament
of Adolf Hitler became more and more hostile toward the
. The tone of this hostility ~rew *dily
m strident, reaching in 1Q36 a pitch of viturcrativeness
own in the intercourse of civilized nations
«
There was every indication that Hitler intended to create a
powerful German army while leading Wasis made references to
the Ukraine as a field for future German expansion. '
To cope with thie danger, Husaia embarked on what
Max Beloff calls a threefold TftSJ . ' ~ Under the direction
of Foreign ter Maxim Litvinov, the Loviet Union sou
to-
1. Prevent the new threat of Germany in the Vest from
combinir s pressure with -'Id threat of
Japan in the fast by mr conc«=
:
c ions to Japan
sent with the United
tetes, a Pacific Fov^r.
2. £vert a general capitalist I I the
-let Union v/ith vehement ti]
the at--11 unratified Four Power Pact i Sfcltl-
va' friendly relation? with as many states as
possible.
3. Avoid or at least delay the atru^le with Germany
by reawakening the old fJenaan fear of a *&r on
two fronts.
Rugh Seta - -tson. From Lenin to Malenkov : T^e.
f
latory of J Communism (New Tort Frederick A. Fraeger,
"53} » p. *
/: Beloff, The fore .:licy &
1 _ [London: Oxford univeraTty Fr*as, ! \ -3 t+9) ,
19Ge r. r.enn*r. > ZojUt Foreign Policy ; '"-' 41
(Princeton, n.J.r . oatrend Companv , mc, , 1960)
,
p.
u8eioff, ex. eit., *'ol. I, pp. - 1.

Two simultaneous paths were chosen to deter Germany.
First, the Soviet. Tnion set out t< -vify tie existing
international orrans and * m them into weapons for the
armed resistance aganst Germany and her allies. Hence, the
entry of the Soviet Onion into the League of Nations in lv34-.
The second path was to complete a Locarno system of guarantees
by paraUai arrangements in the East and in I est and to
L4ge the two systems of security by giving a positive con-
21
tent fee the rapprochement with France,
As defense 691 orations dominated Goviet policy in
the years . the position of the Soviet Union as the
center of world revolutic came loss tenable by Moscow.
Communist parties in peece-lovinr states like France were
therefore directed to prevent the emergence o smments
ready to compromise with the aggressor. ' is became
Mi as the tactic of ths fopular Front.
Ifoe first fe overtures for a closer Franco-Coviet
alignment were made in September 1933 » But to Alexis air.t-
Lager Leger, I oretary-General of the French Foreign Off:
at this time, the Soviet proposals seemed cynical and a
21
id.
, r- 92. A Franco-foviet Pact of Son- ras-
sion eer signed on ' tr 29, 1932. The prime '-St
motive seems tea £km desire I ^ased trad.
..it of :,ion of Germany. - ee






st study of the m Lations for the I - oviet
Pact of Mutual Assistance, signed in 3
22Beloff, ex- cit. , . : , . 3.

shield for tt imperialism I Nevertheless,
he set to mora to remove the impossi cf the
pect-
in the Doumerrue cabinet 6 4, Louis Darthou had
become the French Forei ter. Anti-Communist and anti-
Soviet, a man of the Poincare school of thought, Bartl
had denounced the France- -iet Pact o 2. But with the
advent of the German-Pel' Jon-Aggression Pact of Janue
. the final are of the Rapallo spir fewtotl
Germa-y and the Soviet Union as evidenced by Germany's vit.<
; c attitude, and finally the French disarmament note of
April I"?, 1934, '' Berthcr. turned to examine the state of the
French alliance system. In Kay? -4» Bsrthou met Litvir
Geneva arid the two pursued serious talks on an Eastern
alliance system, was agreed that Russia, Germany » Poland,
Czechos! e Baltic states and ici Finland and
Rumania would be combined in a ity pact to be guaranteed
by a franco-Soviet Pact. uch was the a e \t an Eastern
Locarno.
the same month of ^ay, lv34, I ce thores
.




• S »nd Felix C-il-
(»7ew
"
eneurn, 1963), Vol. U , .bert
'^Rene Alt recht-Carrie, France, j jj, and the j
ar and brothers, T7 P« 256./ars (Hew Y<
2
- ce would henceforth insure her security by
n own meane. ghil note, the French Oc-" at refused




returned from ? oacow, reportedly with instructions for fcl
French Communist Pert cooperate with anti-fascist parties,
particularly tht tela 1 ts.'4' For the next month, the
leadership of the party was reindoctrinated. An appeal
was made to all 3.F.I.O. organ! z at jo-.* and on June 23. an
offer was made to the permanent national board of the ~.F. 1.0.
to conclude a pact against fascism. The Socialist newspaper
Pcpulaire offered a draft pact which the Communists ouio
accepted. The Communists had to promise not to criticise or
attack the Socialists during their joint action. Thorez
Agreed, sayii
,
e want action at any price. Cn July 27,
1934, the pact of unity, inc.! he non-argression items
demanded by the Socialists, was »igB e program of
joint action aimed at mobilising all the workers a ainst the
fascist organisations, which were to be disarmed and
dissolved. The pact was against preparations for war, against
•ecree-laws of the Doumergue government, &r\d against the
"fascist terror in Germany and in Austria.
Barthou's negotiations with the Soviet Government
continued. It was made clear to the Russians that on France'?
Gagncn , c£. pit.
,
BorVenav
, OJ>, cit . , p. 123.
Oahiers du Bolshevjage. July 1, 1934.
Fascist ' m 3 hd« the militant
I
' itist organisations, such as the Croix de Ffu , ©tc.
'?auvet, o£. cit . , pp. 147-14'
•

part, any pact into which she might enter must be reconcil-
able with the Locarno 'Treaty of ] . This could be done
only if France's partner were a member of the e of
Ions, the Toviet Government was therefore od
n the League of Nations en French initiative. On Septem-
ber 14 | i934j the Assembly of the League voted the admission
to membership o ovist ernment was
also awarded a seat on the C U : ix days earlier, on
September 12, Germany rejected the Eastern Locarno proposal.
Csecl akia and Rumania fa a of &n
Easte; lanm Lut Germany, in addition to Italy and Poland,
opposed it. Poland wou? J not enter into any agreement in
which Germany was not also a ither woul
Hcipate in any guarantees of the Lithuanian or Czecho-
52
slovakian frontiers.'" This rejection by Poland was tanta-
mount to a moral collapse of the Franco-Polish Alliance m&
31
in turn helped brl ca and Bus:
On Octo- er 9, 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia £ r
French Foreign minister Barthou were simultaneously assas-
sinated in Marseilles, "rsnee, Yy a member of a Croatian
31
The procedure cf invitation to <oir tl League had
been used previously in the case of Mexico and Turkey in t
early 1930 1l s. It avoided the necessity for an application
by the government concerned, which necessarily would lead
formal scrutiry of that government's quel ifice tien for
League membership. See Beloff , c£. cit. , Vol. , p. 13 .
3 2Beloff, o£. c££. , . : . l t t. ;, .
i ££.• £±L* » I •

21
terrorist 3ocisty. Pierre Level, who had bee- sed I
I 1'iea of an Fsstern Pact, 3*" was named to replace Barthcu.
T. LAVAL /no toe
Laval, who bed already beer. Premier three times, was
a lonrtime pacifist, da 1 to the First World War.
Foreign Minister in the Ooumer MMmt,
be scv \ to re- the Four Power Pact, tc enter into
ser contacts with Italy and to establish reconciliation
with German-.
f in 1935* Laval 'crrneyed to Home where on
34Tbid
. , ft
**l critica"? rapher points out that Laval was
nted For -:ister thanks tc the pressure o£
iness whose a t was needed e new Premier,
Dot* sraon ians approved of the choice,
hcj t a more ebnci"
rans. rt
versity Press, . 190-
B , cr.. cit . | p. , c that d
himself l* cf r" SCR to his own and France's
advantage «n er any clrc had
norance of the wor tea and of the power of
ideas." M' - t*rle, or. cit . , p. 266, agrees that he
*was little resronsive tc ideaTTsa or ideology; the nature
of the regimes that held sway l» France's i* hbors
I him Terent. •' favorable view of Laval a*y
found 1] re Laval, Th aval . "ace by
Jcsee Laval (New Tor) : Char"? es Scribner's Sons, )* h
more recent objective study ta Hubert Ccle, La^al .:
raphy (Ham vor1-: C. P. Putnam f ^ 63). T contemporary
al wrote that h. personal force ar;i capacity.
5 believed that Trance must at all c • - avoid war, and I
hoped to secure by arrangements with the dictators cf
Italy and Germany, a : as he entertained no
pr< |< s«is trusted Soviet lUxssii
Church!]!, TT^c Gathering Storm ( I of The orld




January 7, 193S the Rome Agreements were signed. The
ernments of Prance and Italy declared their continued
devotion tc Austrian independence and solved some petty
quarrels regarding African colonies. The promise of France's
disinterest in Abyssinia would have enormous consequences
later in the year.
The Eastern Locarno negotiations had been pushed sc
far by Earthe u that Laval could hardly drop them, teed,
uerd Harriot, who was Minister of ' tate, would have foi;
any atteaj-t to do so. 1 waver, Laval wa© in no
March 4, : . on announced Ication
of increased military e:cpend1 tures on the ground of clandes-
tine German rearmament. Tan days later, the Fraoc amber
voted for the extension cf the term of military service froa
one to two years, so as to compensate for the lean *rorld Vrar
birth rate. In the voting, the Communists and Socialists
voted aprainst the measu. Theres re. Aly asserted that
the Communist 11 not tolerate the working classes bei
drawn into a lied w&r *n defense of democracy against
fascism. -*' the day follow: ermany announced her
repudiation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty
and declared the reintroduction of corscriptic .
The Persian announcement '*&& greeted olemn pro-
tests from Britai aly and, of com** frr.-c . "ut if
ott t on. cit. , p. 2C .
^Churchill, ex- •= " • '31*
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any Milan was expected to be alarmed and perhaps take
deci a1ve action, It was Prance. By 1935, however, France
was in I recess of evolving from the position of initi-
ator, ruide, director of Furcpean policy, to that of being
the object cf pressures from Lde. When the Chamber
of deputies ant or. March II (their first meeting s5 he
German a cement)
, there was not even a debate on the
issue, *" The Flandin government went no further than to
bring the matter before the League of Hatio- . In April,
the leaders of France, Britain md Italy met at Stress to
coordinate their condemnation of the German action. They
solemr heir loyalty to the Lccarno Treaties e
ienc* "ustris. "he tresa Conference gave
some promise of a united Ttalian-British-French fr nt, but
Ttaly's designs upon Abyssinia were to shatter these hopes.
One unexpected renul German rearmament was
that ti ruined T, aval* a attempts to lor a France- let
Pact.w '/ith little hope of any rener? ssse for an
Eastern Pact bein^r adopted, the Soviet Union urged France to
~1ude a «ral arrangement. Rerriot lent his support.
In April, 1935, it was announced that a mutual assistance
pac ween the Soviet Union and France would be sifned
3 sV- recht-Carrie, cjd. cit . , p.
>
fficlel , Debats Farlemsntaires, Chambre
des deputes, ^aire dc Mars, pr
.

ushortly. tfegotistions as tc the precise form of the pact
had bejrun at Geneva between Litvinov and Lav* :r en-
ted in Paris under the watchful eye of Alexis Le«c«r. It
was Lager who was mat ;>us in workin ; cut a formula that
would be loose enough to satisfy the Brit it. . The Pact
was signed in Paris 1 let feab&ssador Potemkin &r,ti Laval
on Kfty 2, "«
IV* THE PACT
The Franco-Soviet Pact of I of a Treaty
of Mutual Assistance and a Protocol of attare* The
Treaty provided that in the event of an aggression by a
en state on p the .... or France, the two
countries undertook to consult together concerning the en-
forcement of Article 10 of the Lea»u jnant to ensure
rapid action bv the Council of the Lee . If Article 16
(sanctions) were brov^ht into force a^ain^t a an
-ressor who was attacking* either of the two powers, the
other party would afford all aid and assistance in the app
cation of that Article*
The core of the Pact and of the legal controver
which grew up around it later was Article 2, which provided
that in the event of an unprovoked attaci uropean state
Co- , ioc. cit. Paul fteynau-1, the wartime
Prosier, quotes Soviet AmE£s3ador PotemJin as wr tnat
collaborators of Laval tried by every mean: dva the
Pac a %y formal character. See Paul Keynaud, In
Thick pX £h , trans. James D. Lambert {f!ew fc:
and Schuster,"" i P*
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on either France or the- *...., the ether party would
immediately give ell aid and assist* , It seesaa that here
the Russians were in favor of fixing- a definite time limit
but the - B resisted thia. The Protocol oi i - .re
gave this diluted interpretation of the Article-!
It is further agreed that the two contracting parties
wJ tc onsure that the Council
issue their recommendations all th* re-
quired by the circumstanc e . m
oot ir the original] and that, should the Council
or fail to rc-sch an unanimous dec , i'ect shall
rthelessobe riven ( >n to render
assistance.
This left Franc© in a pc >n to dec de freely what ?
required of the Council in the way of speed.
Paragraj rotocc ^ture further
safeguarded Franc I under Locarno tv insist:
that en act of aggression by Germany which brought the Pact
into operation ouet be one recognised as such by the Locarno
guarantors, that is, Great Britain nvA Italy- had
demanded that the Locarno Pact not be mentioned by name in
this Pact, sferences ^ns previousi under*
taken by France . . . in put lis:, es w; vera not
to be invalidated by the Pact obviously meant Locar.- .
a other paragraphs of the Protocol of :>ture
referred to the genesis of the Pact as part of a wider
**TImI original French text of the Pact :«®d
In Scott, cj_. eii#, pp. 272*275 ei*
International Affairs, 1 Affairs,
I sh tran si ar in




eec Ity syatem for Eastern >«, which was he
stated ultimata objective. It made clear that as a nam
e of 'sltimate objective, the Franco-:: oviet Pact
would a| in the case of agression by the third
partner rr tfee Pact, namely, Germany. In case of
ressio^ upon ^rfirce or the Soviet Dnicr ther power
or powers, of the Hon- ressicn Pact of
-i come irto force \ that is to say, no
assistance would be given by either party to the aggressor.
r he Pact was to come into force after ratificati
and to have a duration cf five years. If rot re sd then,
it world remain in force indefinite!- U renounced.
The intent of the Pact was clear and its Carman
focus unraista*--shj . The f9s9% was exclusively European as
Far Fas tern matters remained outside 1 .rview. Rut as
George Kennar. wrote, the lanruare of the agreement was
watered down to the point of meaninglessneaa*
Two weeks after the etgning of the France- : . i©t
Pact, a rcviet-Czech Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed,
on Kay 16, 1935, in Prarue he Czech President Senas and
the Soviet Sinister to Czechs akia. The provisions of
this pact were identical with those of the Franco- . i.et
Pact, but its Protocol of rirrature stipulated that t:
pre ns of al assistance s' ae into force c_
l F. Kennan, P.ussia and the v/est LOiixX
and Stalin (1 ew Tert : Ti@rican"~rf TTiter-
ature, Inc. , ' - •"> . r. < 6.

if France gave assistance to the country attacked. The Pact
was therefore dependent on the etill unratified Franco-
Soviet Pact or upon the Franco-Czech f reaty 01 her 2 ,
1925* Historian George Yernadaky assum this
proviso, France hoped to obtain some insurance against rash
or nssive moves by the Soviet Union.*'
After the signirr of the Pact, Laval visited Moscow
from May 13-15* 19 $* It the conclusion of the visit a
communique was released in which both govern expressed
their desire for continued friendship, th nt on to
It is precisely for the sake of maintainir ?e
:ates are obliged, above gll, r.
weaken in any way their means of national defense.
On this , Is rr-rricular, I n ex-
pressed complete understanding and approval of the
national defense policy pursued by France with the
object of maintaining its armed forces at a, 1aval
i. stent with 11 f requirem>"-. I .
he day following the publication of the communi-
que, a member of the Political Bureau of the French Commun-
is' Paris explained the new policy of the ?&rtr
The peace policy of Stalin, he explained, was not only in
conformity with the historic instructions of Lenin,
^eloff, C£. cit . , ffcl, T, p.
**0a6rge Vernedsky, A History of Russia (5th *•'.-
Jfew Haven; Tale University ^ress/TyoTjf, p. 3 73.
J ?*a (ad.) , Soylo.^ jtocumants on fjwrwl




also corresponded with the interests of the proletary
Furthermore, in view of ths» international situation, es»
cial n arisen danrer, 'there la for the awment a
dence * etween the interests of solae France and the
tat T-nior aga rTitlar and his - .: Ism,
prlncir-sT ators of war in Furcpe."*' Henceforth, *
Ccvsunlsts became "more patriotic than the old-fashlor
F«: - ,, to the aurpri.e and frror of the Lt* .
I e dictum from i I was the signal for the French
Corner- - cease its opposition to the two year
con«crir 11, %© drop the old slorans of "A has la
OuerreT" tnaant that the Party should no Xi
stand in the way of voting credits afcraas I armaments.
But maveric! re Marty still had fears abc te pretence
of strong armies in capitalist countries where they could be
used a&ains s workers,' that is, the Censnunir-t Party.
^
The Party, however, complied and set about to convince the
entire French Left of the soundness of its new poller.
res i The ucceases of j_
jlted Front { Report s of tET, "or Ule^SoiiSBun-
1st I tonal: darn , ltd,, !)» p.
'harlas A. Kicaud, The French Hlght and Magi Ger-
any Mil") , ' f$«w Yarks 0©ta /'""inc., 19HTT p. k
*iPhls work, originally published bv Ogk« University In 1943,
is a scholarly study of hew and w3 .- aban-
doned hope in libera' ism and looked to an autocratic regime
protect its social and ; ale p- many n
spects, it la f the eoli -tudy,
arty. For Peace,? For the?
Soviet TJni eports eft of t! mm-




It should be emphasised at this point ti te
Franco-Soviet Pact was the work of men like- I Sarthou, a
conservative who cared no f ; for pie- the Cobbbui
Prance. He Xi simply at the security aspects of the Pact,
security for France arainst Germany. Laval was equally un-
impressed by t3 wrintsaa, '-'here i3 evidence to indicate
at he did not w he Pact, t; e sour dilute and
lo- hat he preferred r . ilia tion v,l itler m
\&t with the Bolsheviks. Reportedly, he went
to Moscow either at the insistence of the French railit ai
or because he wanted to "spike the gwis of the Communis ta"
who had teen opposing the extension of military service, a:
perhaps i a small wedge between them and alists,
wh<- LI stood for disarmament, 51 jn any event the Coir-
aunits supported Laval Si municipal elections of Kay
5, and helped re-elect him mayor of Auvergne. On
. r Crotch, France Cutbluffed, Current
Hlatorr,
. p. 6 .
^Cole, o£. cit.
, p. 61 . This cf spj the
Communists" as a motivating factor for th< I rip i
inforce : -he report of
"
'. « £mbassa "it which indi-
cated that Laval had told n that Fre
would ndors tand if Commt id not c
to the army budget and the year service i-ited
ates Department of e, Fc he Hnlted
.stes ( C< ":, 1.
!~, p. :':" . list on Laval's mind daring the Moscow trip was
the prospect of prevail talin to loosen up on the
Catholics in Russia so as to erdear Laval to the Pope [m
e French Catholics). The often quoted question of
•/ many divisions doe^ have? re- !e
durir -al talV' . £•• Churchill, ct> cit.
,
p. 335.
^ 2r he extreme Left, especially the Communis , ---rud
significantly well in the local electic- In the

June ?, Laval Lecame Premier while retaining the post of
Fcrei Inister for himself.
cording tc the r ions of Uutlon of
I Third Republic, treaties which die" in to peae
,
commerce, finances or property rights of Frenchmen abroad
could he rat 4 by the President without recourse to the
Parlism* The Frareo-5- ovist Pact, therefore, t be
ratified by decree. But for reasons known heat to Pierre
Laval, but robably in an ettr e tfti ie
before ratification, he chose to submit the treaty to the
Parliament for ratification. Between summer adjournment and
parliamentary delays, it was nearly a year before the Pact
came before the Chambers for debate. Likewise, Laval made
nc attempt tc implement the Pact with a military conventle
His official reason for this was that he hoped the world
would view the agreement as a pact for peace rather than &
alliance for war.^ But the plans of Pierre Laval and the
peace he world wart tared by Italy* s designs on
' hiopla. But, first, a look at the Comintern in the summer
of 39 *
p, a Communist, Marcel Cachin, was elected to the
Franc. 1 1 .
53Eliza'r . . Csse> aaement
l&gtoni marica tl on - , 3 £zF,
p.
-%eport by Ambassador Bullit, in United states





The Seventh C us of the Communist Int ional
met oscow from July 25 to August 2C, , . Its main
si canes was to give official sanction to the idea of
the Popular Front tactic.
The signs of the Kremlin's new change of policy were
evident in Fcsecw during the two months before the Comintern
.as m fumiss reported that the Hay B&y cele-
hn hewed no s of emphasis on world revolu-
tion and international unitv of the militant pi
had been the case in previous eelebrat He we to
draw the conclusion that the Soviet at- no longer figures
as the leader of a world-wide class me . /en the
annual message of the Executive Committee of the Comintern
was a rather mild appeal to wage-earners everywhere to
str for bread-and-butter advantages such as §r wages
and shorter hours. ovist Government and the Commun-
ist International were indeed changing tactics. Fear of a
reviv; a prime motivating force.
ilia's fear of the new German menace (now that
Germany had publicly announced rearmament) was most evident
throughout the Congress, hut e I dly in a speech delivered
by Karcel Cachin, the first French Communist Senate
delefatas heard him warn, "Comrades, the Soviet Union was
. Furniss, "Patriotism Comes to the fevie'
Currant History, "" T TI Ut
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never more threatened than today by decadent imperial! a».
To stew the tide of the Nasi and Fascist menace the Soviet
Union offers its pacts of non-argressior, peace fruarantees
and mutual assi i te all nations, no matter which they
ar .
, the other French Communist leaders spoke
of the dangers pr®&& viet Union, of their suppr
for aecvrity pacts such as the recent! S Trm - Ovlat
Pact, and of their enthusiasm for the technique of the Popu-
lar Front. Georire Dimitrov, the General Secretary of tr
Con areas and the man who had been acting as lea: the
Comintern for months, emerged as the leading character of
the Congress* He too w%m%& of the dangers to tl
Union, W\ pointed with pride .e Fre I Party
as an example for Communist parties in all other countries
to follow,'" Perhaps as a reward to the French Party, tndr®
Marty was ele:. & Sxe a Costal t tee of the Inter-
national, the tin m a Franchaan was so berored
Ihe Congress closed in August,
directive for all Communist parties heir
might and by all means to st the and to i
%arcel Cac ±£ Fiaht for tt& People ! s Front j&
France (Reports of the Seventh Congress of I .muniat
International I'cdem Books, Ltd., [1935]), pp. 13-
*~A. Rossi, A Cojs^xmiB^ Party in Action, trsns. and
ad, VTillmere r«ndall""( few HavenlisXeH* Ivornftv Press,
1949), p. 212* This war 1 a particuU ; and detailed
account of the French Communist Party in the years I - -5.





against the enemies of the USSR.*1 During the next few years
the efforts by the Communist parties in this direction were
evident particularly in France, but also in Great Britain
and even ir the United States.
The incident at W«l tfal had occurred in December,
1934, tut it wee net until October 3» 1935, that Italian
troops began the conquest of :inia. We have already
seers that while in Home in January, 1935, Pierre Laval gave
Mussolini at least the impression that France was disinter-
ested in Abyssinia. Perhaps with this in mind, Mussolini
launched his campaign of congest ir the lands of Haile
Selassie,
The French Government , desiring to retain Italy as
an ally against Germany, held back on taking action. But
Great Britain had decided not to tolerate this fracture of
the peace by Mussolini* specially when I udan and the
32 Canal seemed threatened. tain there reduced
resolutions in the League Council, «h@re on October ?, 193 5
»
Italy was declared guilty of aggression, VZhen the league
ordered economic sanctions against Italy, France, wider
Laval, had nc choice but to follow the lead of Britain, At
least in this instance, the French Communist Party had its
iward Hallett C®rr, GermanrSoviet Relatione
5etweeji the. IVo |/orld _srs 1JU&35S (Mltlicre: The Johns
fepkins Press, 19 "17, p. 1177
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way. A majority of the Frer~ , on the other hand,
disapproved, sn tho question of oil sanctions came up,
taval objected, convinced that it would lead to open u
with Italy* In the end, oil eanctions were n®y®r applied,
and to the chagrin of the French Communist Par J usselini
was successful in subdi -^sinia during the followir
May of 1936.
The Hoare-Laval Plan of December 1935 was despised
by the French Left, indue 1 he Communists. The Right
generally approved. But it was British public outrr
that brought about a collapse of the plan and the resignation
of Sir Samuel Hcare. laval managed to endure the initial
reaction but his government fell in January, 193 for
the effect of the Abyssinian ¥ar on the French, the diplomatic
historian Albrecht-Carrie sums it up this way?
Within Prance, the effect of the Abyssinian imbroglio
was to make confusion worse confounded and to raise
the bitterness and recriminations of her divisit-
to further heights of weaken! isinte.rrat'
The French Communist Party saw the relationship between
appeasement to Fusselini md appeasement to Hitler. Commun-
ist Deputy Gabriel Peri put it this m In France those
who want to give liberty of action to Italian Fascism are
i £&« £it»» f* 55.
''laval, o£. cit
. , p. 10.
icaud, c£. cit., pp. 52-53.
^Albrecht-Carrie, o£. cit., p. » -
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the very ones who admit that we must five a free hand to
•-merism." 64
Anti-Cornrcunist force* in Franco had maneuvered them-
selves into a ? r in which they were rot
Fascist as an alternative to Communist, but were pro-German
as well.
Following the fall of Laval's government, the
moderate leftist cabinet of Albert 3arraut came to power
on January 24, 1936. Besides the deep embarrassment over
Abyssinia, Premier sarraut and his Foreign Minister, Pierre-
Ftienne Fir
,
faced the problem of ratify tm Franco-
let Pact of ? utual Assistance,
Germany was strictly opposed to the Pact, As early
as Fay 25, 1935, a memorandum to France had called the Fact
incompatible with the Locarno Treaties or the grounds that
France claimed for herself the right to decide unilaterally
and at her own discr who was the aggressor in the event
of a German-Soviet conflict, and in virtue of that decisic
to take military action against Germany, J
Debate in the French Chamber had already been
aiderAbly delayed, as has been mentioned. In early 1936 it
was again delayed by the vicious assault on Leon Blum by
members cf a fascist organisation on February 13* Finally,
on February 16, 1936, Foreign ? inister Flandin defended the
^Cited in Micaud, ej>. cjx
. , pp. 64*65.
5Se!off, eg. clt. , p. V t
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Pact fnder the principle of collective security. To satisfy
Germany's objections en the legality of the Pact, the Govern-
ment offered to submit the Pact before the Permanent Court
of International Justice. Radical leader Edouard Harriot
6?
stressed the military fains the Pact would brim . On the
other hand, opponents of the Pact pointed to the subsidies
provided by the third International to the French Communist




1 when the Prance-Soviet Pact was si£r-
the idea of a Russian connection had considerable support in
France. But by late winter of 1935-1936, opinion In the
Chambers and among the public had ebaogedU Mlcaud points
cut that the moderate Right did not object to the pact until
the fall of Laval T ^rnment. Py early 1936, with the
presence of the moderate Leftist cabinet of Sarrant in power
and the prospects of a future Popular Front government in
the effing, the moderate Right feared that the Pact would
become a full-fledged military alliance in the hands of a
Popular Front rovemment. Ihey ware obviously and uncom-
fortably aqueesed between their desire to maintain the
^Ibld .. p. 160.
'rhen asked about the Tsarist debts to France and
the unsettled problem of French property nationalized by the
Isheviks, Harriot asked why France had not honored her war
debts to the United State^. :e Francis Brown, % Drama of
French Politics, Curren t History , 3JLIV Upril 1936), p. tl6.
£ p
Cameron, Prologue to .Appeasement , j . 1 n.
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security cf France end the dread of serving the interests of
the Third Internationa 1 . Propaganda by the Italians,
Germans and the militant French t had convinced many
frenchmen that ratification cf the Pact would increase the
position cf the Soviet Union ,Sj and enhance the position of
the French Communist Party.
Germany renewed her attacks on the Pact in Januery
1936 and it was hinted that if the Pact was ratified by the
French despite German claims of its violation of Locarno,
Germany would press for revising the status of ths Bhineland,
demilitarized under the same Locarno Treaty.'* The arrival
of the Soviet army's Inspector-General in Paris during the
second week of February, 1936, gave the Germans fresh cause
for alarm and for increasir l&fcaeks on the Pact by the
German press.
In debates in both the French Senate and Chamber,
the most solid support for the Pact came from the Radicals
and Communists, while the Socialists reluctantly gave their
support because of the Popular Front alliance. But the
French Bight, traditionally anti-German, showed a surprls:
terderness for Reich sensibilize- . On February 27, 1936,
cc.ud, c£. c it. » pp. 69n,
?°Paul Reyraud states that the "principal incentive
behind the opposition to the alii ussla was
Communir See Peynaud, oj>. cit . , p. ' •
718elcff, loc. cit.
7
*Brown, o£. cit . , p. #5 •

the Chamber cf Deputies finally ratified the Pact by the
vote of 353 to 164.''-* But before the Senate completed
ectic tier moved again.
It should be noted that the Sarraut government was
virtually a care-taker government. Parliamentary electi<
were scheduled for April and May, 1936, and prospects for a
new mment were almost certain. The Sarraut government
was still completely absorbed in foreirn affairs with the
Abyssinian imbroglio. At home, economic and financial prob-
lems clouded the political atmosphere. It was in this state
of affairs that Hitler chose to explode his next interna-
tional bombshell. On March ?, 1936, German troops entered
the Rhinelanl. Tot only wgs the Treaty of Versailles dis-
regarded but the voluntary Treaty of Locarno was violated.
In Paris, the cabinet met to consider the breach.
The Soviet Ambassador to France had offered Soviet support
to Flandin. Eeportedly, Foreign Minister Flandin and
three other members of the cabinet were in favor of military
action while others, including Paul-Boncour, were opposed,
Onlv George Fardel wanted general mobilisation. Many in
the militarv pleaded for calm, patience, dels- . At any
^Be.loff, loc. cit.
\ cr_. cit., Vol. II, p. 50.
op. cit
. , p. 2? .
^Churchill, o£. cit., p. 194.
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rate, no military plan was ready for such a contingency. ^?
iches by Premier Sarraut on March # and 10 clearly indi-
cated to Hitler that his gamble had succeeded. It was Great
Britain which cautioned Franca against doing anything irrep-
arable. "'British opinion, with surj risinp* unanimity, was
ready to accept this German action as basically and mora
sound. The heart of the ctatter was that France was weai
internally and the domestic state of France was paramount.
The government considered that it could not afford the
mobilisation psychologically (dreaded memories of what
mobilisation did in 1914) and financially (the value of the
franc was already precarious) . Oermany sought to ease the
tenseness of the situation by declaring that she had no more
territorial ambitions in the West and offered the French a
treaty. In the end France did nothing but protest and rein-
force the garrisons of the Maginot Line with 'a few colonial
iments."^
It was only after the remilitarisation of the Rhine-
land by Hitler that the French Senate, by the vote of 231 to
52, ratified the Franco-Soviet Pact on March 12, 1936.
unexpectedly, the Central Committee of the Soviet Union duly
'"an » Pacinf dictators (Bost<
Houston Mifflin Company, 1962) , p." " .
'
brecht-Carrie, cj> cit
. , p. W«
ndre Tiacn, JVccuse! Ihe Ken Vho Betraved
France (Hew Tor' ial Pre? 40)7 P« lo2V

ratified the Pact en >'arch 26. ^°
The rejection of th© Franco-Soviet Pact by so many
of the French r ight is significant in that it revealed a
breai: in the traditional policy of these French national
This rejection, says Micaud, "may be interj-reted as the
prelude to the appeasement of Germany at the expense of
Eastern Europe. r The security of Francs had been, until
1935 » almost the sole aim of French nationalism* Germany
had been the perennial enemy of France, particularly hated
because •« German invasions in the wars of 1C?G and 1914*
The rost World tfar I policies of France sought to maintain
military superiority over Germany and to maintain a system
of alliances in Eastern and Western Kurope to keep Germany
in check, the failure of France to prevent the rearmament
of Germany in 1935 » the failure of France to prevent the
remilitarisation cf the F.hineland in 1936, and the failure
of the French Nationalists or Right to support the ratifica-
tion of the Pact with the Soviet Onion were major turnir
points in the traditional policy of France. France wes no
longer the foremost rower on the Continent cf Europe.
The presence of the French Communist Party was cer-
tainly a factor in the change of outlook by the French Right.
The threat of war in fastem Europe seemed high to a portion
of the and neither Poland nor Russia merited the rir





of French involvement in that war, The Soviet bid for
collective security or bilateral pacta was viewed as a new
Russian tactic to dominate the future governments of Prance.
This fear was accentuated by:
1. The formation of the Popular Front.
The electoral successes of the left, especially
jTunists, in the local elections of 1935.
3. the abrupt reversal of the foreign and domestic A9licies of the Communist Party since 19
This fear, then, was the influence of the French
Communist Party. It caused the F tc steer clear of
association with Moscow at almost pry price. Had the French
Corn: t Party been as insignificant as it was in 1932,
chances are that the French Right would not have Of I the
Pact with "oscow, certainly not as fiercely as it did. 1%e
Pact was indeed ratified but subsequent events, namely, the
Popular Front victory in the spring of and the Spanish
Civil War of that summer, caused the French Right to re-
double its fear of communism. This fear contributed heavi"
in preventing the Pact from attaining any military or rcli-
tieal significance. Bttfife a Franco-Soviet arrangement mi
have deterred Hitler fro® embarking on his plans of expansion,




For nearly two years, France subjected herself to
the government of man who had joined together in a Popular
Front a; rising tide of fascism in StiTOpt* Althci
conceived in good faith, this Popular Front was unable t
resolve the unrest at home cr to arrest the downward trend
of the position of France in world affair .
I. THF OF 1936
It has been mentioned that a Pact of United Action
was signed by the Socialists and CoEaaunists on July 21! , ' I4<
As early as October 10, 1934 1 Thorez proposed in the name of
the Central Ccmittee of the Party that the Communist-
cialist alliance be expanded to the right so as to inclu
the middle classes* His proposal was to create un vaste
rqagerableac- _ ruIaAre, pour If. pain , pour la liberte
pour la paix ."'* later that same aonth, Thcrez publicly
invited the Radicals to join a cosEaon program but they were
reluctant to do so. But informal cooperation in the munici-
pal elections in Paris between the Coiasannists, Socialist
$ Fouvet, Histoire du Parti Communis-to Fran-
f




and Radicals proved highly successful in May* 1935.
JWM , Communist Thorez, Socialist Blum and Radical
Daladier spoke from the same platform at a meeting celebrat-
ing the May electoral successes. During the Bastille Day
celebrations of July 14 that summer, the three parties and
2forty-five other organizations took part in a ,1oint demon-
stration which peacefully rivalled a similar demonstration
by the Rightist leagues. Ten thousand representatives sr
the Marseillaise and the Internationale a3 the French Tricolor
and the Red flar of the Communists flew side by side.-* As
the year went on» the increase in the activities of the
Fascist leagues during tht I er half of Laval's Premiership
tended to bring the parties closer together. On January 11,
6, the Rassemblement Populaire , formally organized with
the addition of the Hadic .-"- t delists of Daladier and
Harriot , the smaller Socialist-Hepubliean Party, the two
major trade union organisations and a few smaller groups,
announced its formation and mad® known its program* This
action was followed in March by the merging of the C. ...
with the C.G.T. which unified the two later organizations.
The economic depression of the 1930* s came somewhat
later to France than to mo: t ether an countries. As a
result, France had enacted less social legislation for the
Maurice There* , France Today and the People's Front,
trans. ?mile Burns {London: "TTctor Gall ones, ltd., 1935)'$
p. 1#$.
^Fauvet, o£. cit . , pp* 165-16?.
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workers* protection than other industrialised nations. When
the impact of the depression finally <?truc! France in the
mid-0 « the atmosphere was ripe for bitter class feeli
and a polarisation of the electorate. Fascist organizations
appealed to the discontent of all classes, especially the
lower middle class, and won considerable support. On the
other side of the spectrum, the Popular Front parties,
especially the Communists and the 5ocialists, reminded the
workers that for years they had suffered from unemployment,
lew wage* and a steady drop in the standard of livi . fhQ
solution, thsy advised, was in electing a Popular Front
amber of Deputies in 1936 which would enact the necessary
social legislation, such as the forty hour week, md imple-
ment $ foreign policy for the "Defense of Peace. This
latter program called for international collaboration in the
League of Nations, the use of sanctions, nationalisation of
war industries and the extension cf a system of pacts, open
u all nations, on the lines of the Francp- let Pact.
Enthusiasm for the coming elections was high.
Reporter Alexander #erth noted that In the days before the
elections he would journey to outlying villages and there
find 'a Comnmnist me-, cialist meetinr and a Croix
de Feu mee lM Communists, in their new-found
^Ceoffrey Fraser and Thadee Hatonscn, I,eon Slum , fcan.
and Statesman (Kew Torki J. ippencott Company, 1938),
r "-, 1 7
lexander Vert'
,




X? (October 1936) , p. H2.
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patriotism, exorted the people tc fellow the Communist
Party, the successor tc spirit Arc and the
French devolution. They sought support from all classes,
all creeds. Id T'aurice Thores in a radio speech on April
17:
We, who are laymen, extend our hand to you, the
Catholic, the laborer, the employer, th rtasan,
the peasant because you are cur brother and because-
you are, like us, weighed dewr same anxiety. 7
The French went to the polls on April 26 and May 3,
1936, to elect their new parliament. Under the Popular Front
a£re«*«nt, each party was for its own candidates in the first
round of elections. In the second round of balloting in May,
each Popular Front party promised to support the candidate
with the beat showing araoni: them in the first round, but k !
had failed to grain the required majority of all votes cast.
In the second round, a plurality was sufficient.
In the April elections, the Communist Party polled
1,4^7,336 votes, or 12.6% of the votes cast* Ihey had won
°Alexan< irih, The Twilight of Trance, ed. with
an Introduction by D. W. Brogan; New Tcr¥: TTarper and 3ro-
>rs, 1942)
, p. 72.




Fauvet, 0£. cit . , p. 191. 1h« aiae of the vote re-
ceived by the CcrmmmiSt Part I not be taken as an
lication of Communist Farty membership, which was far
lower. Communist Partv membership durin thirties is
estimated an follows: 1932: 25,uOo; ; 1935:
3j 1936:^329,0,,.: and 193^: 350,000. These figures were
fiven dre Ferrat, a former Communist. Cite io
inaudi, J«an-$'arle Doraenach and Aid© Garosci, Cogimunisia in





sixty-three seats in the Chamber of ^erutios. In the sec
round of balloting in May, thev won ancther nine seats, for
a total of seventy-two seats in the Chamber. The Socialists
.) won the nest seats with 149, while the Kadicals
ware second with 111 seats. Together, the frcj oul aire
control 3.ad JB9 seats. * The Communists proved to be the
strongest party in Paris and its industrial belt. In some
ratal traaa* the vote ran as high as 2051 for the Cociaunists. 10
*The final composition of the Chamber ?ruties as
a result of the elections of April-**ay 1936 was as follows;
Independents ^re cains .13
Federation r \ icsine 59
In i isnts d*action populaira 16
RenubJicsins independents et arraires
independents , * 4U
La Droits .3
Hapuhlieains de gauche et radlcaux
independent? 44
Democrats pcrulaires ........ 13
Oeuche democratique et radiceux independents », $
La Centre . 95
Front National • * .223
Gauche independents ........ 2^
Badicsux et radicaux-socialistas . ..... .111
Union socialists et republic&ine ....... 29
Socialistes S.F.I.Q 149
Communistes ................ . 72





Sea Kleaudy e£. cit., p. 23?, and Edgar Pac Jean, the
New French Chamber," Forel^ P. ffairs , ' (July 193&J, p. 706,
%ax Belcff , The Foreign Policy of Soviet Husaia,
1929-1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1947-
]
Vol. Is I p. 23; and Feuvet, ££• cit . , Carte II, for a map
showing the geographical distribution of the vote.
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The electoral success of the Popular Front was,
a large decree, a protest vote against the foreim policies
of the Sarraut government, especially in regard to the
Ethiopian effair and against the domestic problems of defla-
tion and uremployment. It was also the result of the Left
rallying tortther to save France from what they feared was
a pr&ve denser from the French Fascist Right. The Rirht,
on the other hand, viewed the Popular Front victory as *
threat of • 'cratnunist take-ever in France. The French body
;ltic was now ti hly divided. Each rroup fed its
fears on the assumed intentions of the opponent.
•tiring to the press en May 6, 1936, Kaurice Thores
announced that the Communist Party would call for a soak
the ric' llcy as well as an extraordinary and progressiva
tax (three per cent) on large fortunes. On the
international scene, he demanded the application of a firm
policy of peace and the organisation of collective secur
under the League alonr the lines of the Fra viet Pact.
He called for repair of the damage caused by I aval in his
Home accords, aid to Caechoslovakia, rapprochement between
Poland and other pacific states and a guarantee of the
independence of Poland as the 'gauge' cf the peace of
Europe.-12
News item in the New Tort- Times , 6.
x Maurice Thoreg, !a Position du Parti Communist©





The Popular Front had won, The Communist Party had
made an excellent showing. But if promise rede. hi rob-
lems and suspicions rede higher.
II. BLW AND THF S7PD-
Leon Blum, " the Socialist leader, had the tasV- of
forming • overnment. 1th it3 seventy-two Deputies, the
Communist Party was expected to insist on joining the new
goveromer*-, * ricr to the election, Itocrex indicated that
the Communi in certain eventualities might participate
in a Popular Front government.-^ But on Vay 15 * 1936, he
announced that the Party would not pertic the Blum
government because, he insisted, the presence of the Com-
munists in the cabinet would be more of a disadvantage than
an advantage to the government, in that Commur reserce
would offer a pretext to s«k of the to spread
panic. It the same time, Thores expressed his hopes for t
foreirn policy of the Blum government. IT© said he did r
want to see France implementint?; a sanctionist foreign poll
^er orders of 'bourgeois© England"' when Italy was the
object, then implementing an anti-sanctionist foreign poll
^Blum was bom in l£?2, the son of a well-to-do, but
not wealthy, Jewish family. A scholar by training, he was
wn for his intellectual honesty md sine - tthar
or b was forceful enough tc fe known as a great Premier
is easily dist . For a favorable biography, but limited
in time, see Fraser and Katanson, o£. cit .
^Thcres, Prance Today and the People T s Front ,
p. 254.

when 'Hitler Germany' was the The reference to the
Inaction on the rart of France to Herman remilitarization
of the Rhineland, two months earlier, was clearly indicated,
Hicrcz went on to se
Our faith is in Soviets baaed on the life of our
brothers in foviet Russia. Under the direction of
the sole party of the workinr class, we
r
will some
day succeed in creating a new society, lj>
Franz Bcrkenau is of the opinion tr th Thores
and Jacques Dulcos were actually in favor of joining the
cabinet, while /-ndre Marty was opposed, the final decision,
accorii: rkenau, was mad© by Cominter ,;retary Oiml-
trcv, menach believes that the Communis
did not join the government because they did not trust the
Socialists and, furthermore, that the wave of sit-down
strikes, already beginning, indicated that the workir
classes expected many changes which the Communists knew the
new government could not effect, 1 " atever the actual
reason, the Communists did not join the cabine tside
the cabinet, they were able to attack the government for its
i%«n« item In the Uwj Tork YJaeS i Kay I , 36? and
Fauvet, 0£. cit,
, n • 196-197.
1 Franz Bcr&enr roreeu Communism (New Tork:
Harper and Brothers, 1953}" p. 159*
1
r.inaudi, Dcmenach and Cerosci, o&. cit . , yr. 72-
Blua's first cabinet included eighteen oclalists,
fourteen Radicals (including §• Pierre Cot and Dela-
complete list of members.
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shortcomings and yet claim credit for many of the popular
measures brought about by fcfee lar Front. Bias, no
doubt, was relieved when the Communists declined to partici-
pate, '
Although the second round of elections had bean held
on May 3» the new Blum government was not installed until
June 4, 1936, when the term of the new Parliament began. In
the meantime, France was plagued by a series of sit-down
strikes which began on May 11. In June 1936 alone, there
were a total of 12,142 strikes involving 1,630,93$ striker?
The cause of the strikes seems to have been the
spontaneous reaction cf the workers themselves, partly
celebrating the vict f the Popular Front, partly antici-
he social reforms then expected, and partly as a
means of p5~es3urinr the new government into enacting those
reforms quickly. Certainlv the Communists were not to blame
for the strikes, but they were forced by circumstances not
to object to them. L ' Humanlte did not begin to talk about
the strikes until May 20, nine days later. * Blum was placed
Alexander Werth notes that Communists in the govern-
ment would make a bad impression abroad, especially in
land. See Werth, The Twilight of France, p. S9.
hilip, stus of French
Labor,' Foreign Affairs , XVII (July ), p. 742.
211Ms point seems well documented. See Borkenau,
pp . cit., y. 16- ; cbert Dell, 'Hew Directions in France,
Current History, H43 (January 1939), p. V ; and Beloff,
op . cit ., VolIII p. 2 .
22Fauvet, c£. cit., p. 196.
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In the embarrassing position of having either to break the
sit-down strikes fore or to tolerate them. . He chcae
the latter.
:• reaction to the strikes in the Western world
was swift and pointed. The British feared that Blum had
become a Eerensky. 2^ Blum sought to allay the fears of
France f s friends by sayin
I am spoken of as a Kerensky who is preparing the
way for a I. end* . I car re you tha is
not goiftC to be a Kerensky Government; and it is
eque n that if we fail, we shall be suc-
ceeded not by a lenin, 2*
Even the Communists became alarmed at the extent of
the strips. T.-iores commented on June lu, It la rtant
to know when to stop a stroke: for otherwise one is apt
to play into the hands of reactionaries."** 3ut three days
1st* , ores added fuel to the fire and. further embarrassed
the government by remar) that the m I ware ti
d care of the factories in which they were conducts
round tie clock sit-down strikes because the factories
would soon be the property of the workers anyway/ That
same eveninf, at & rally cel^brat he victory of the
signing of the KfttiSDM Agreements, the French Communist
Party unfurled their newly devised national flag of Soviet
-*New5 item in I |fg York Times , J\ ,
2i
*Cited in "'.erth, The 2 jt of France , . .
2
*Ibid ., p. V9.
Jews item in the flew York Times , June 15, 1936.
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France: a red field with the traditional Tricolor in the
top corner and (Perviblique Franchise) on the
red field with a hatsaer and sickle between the letters. 2?
The crown cheered the victorious strikers as Cosmmnist
heroes and cries of TTne France 1 ibre , Forte et Hepreusel
er-^ T-5* Soviets Fartcutf rar , 2
'
ch conduct pave rise
to the fiction that it was the Communists who inspired the
strikes. r least, the CouBtunists could be blamed for the
strikes and be accused of disloyalty to France*
At home and abroad, rtftCtlec continued: The French
Right, which had not been too upset over the results of the
election in Fay, was now thoroughly alarmed. That Franco-
Soviet Pact now took on a significance which it did not have
previously. The notion that Moscow had extended and t
ened her hold on France gained ground. The new French Govern-
ment, it was feared, would bend to the noisy demands of f
areola! -ty and play into the hands of the Soviets.
rpr^any and Italy were loud in accusing France of becoming
an instrument of the Comintern and a vehicle for the spread
of coTTSsunism. As a result:
A part of Furope became insensibly pro-Hitler in
exact proportion as— in the eyes of superficial ob-
servers—France seemed to be driftin o Comraun-
ism.29
^V'erth, The Twilight of France , p. 91.
™*aloff, o£. cit. , Vol. II, p. 24.
adimir d fOrmesson, France, trans. F. Lewis May
(Hew Tork: Longmans, Green and Company, 1939), p. 166.
I
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Blum's Jewiafcness became an easy target. Hitler and
Mussolini are said to have considered tha presence of a
liberal and a Jaw as head of tha French Government as a
personal insult. Enemies of the Popular Front brought
forth a new wave of French anti-sesaitism t latent since the
Dreyfus affair. How easy to launch a slogan like 'France in
the hands of the Jews!*^1
its first weeks In power, the Popular Front
government of Lecn Blum was almost completely absorbed with
the strides and agitation of the masses. With unprecedented
speed, a host of sweeping economic and social reforms were
rammed through the Parliament, the Mati^non Agreements were
si^med between the trade unions and the employers, the Two
^*dred Families^ lost control of the Bank of France, and
the Croix de Feu end other Fascist Leagues were dissolved,
t as for foreign pollcv, apart from the general
Ideologies} antipathy to Fascism in all its forms, the For
lar Front did not introduce fresh ideas in the domain of
foreign policy. Forei^m affairs were largely left In the
hands of the permanent officials at the Cuai d'Grsay^ tiiers
^Albert Guerard, France; £ Todarn History (Ann
Arbor: The University o f T* 1 chinan">re3s , 19!$') , " . U9«
31Tves 8. Simon, TT^e Road to tTichy K-i;^193^ > trans,
James A. Corbett and Ceo rre J. rrow (New tcrfc
:




Worl d Jars (New York: Harper ar.TSrothers, lv61)
, p. 301.
33Praser and Matanscn, c£. cit . , p. >.
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Alexis 5ai r was still Secretary*General. The
influence of permanent officials is usually on the side of
traditional policy« In the case of French foreign polic
during the period of the Popular Front, this seems definitely
to be the case. The French CcBusunist exercised no
direct influence in the adoption of any policy favored by
the Part By no means did the Party take over the Foreign
Ministry. Yvon Delbos, a Radical, held that portfolio; and
Le^er, perhaps & little vitiated L>y his association with
. Laval/ was prone to a policy of laissez-faire,
ther, as we shall see, did the proverament listen to the
counsels of the Party in the years which followed. The
French Communist Party became so feared and hated as a
result of the strikes, which they did not imti.rate, that
the Party could do no right. The first foreign policy crisis
of the Blum government, th nish Civil War, served to
enlarge this fear and hatred.
III. THE SPANISH CIvTt WAB
The Popular Front government of Leon Blum had teen
in power scarcely six weeks when it was confronted by a
major fc n policy problem in the form of nish
Civil War. The implications of this str • in a neighbor:
red Howard, Perilament and For olicy
in Trmcs (Xes The Cresset Press, 3 ' F, p. 15?,.




state were to further divide the French people and weaken
the new French Government.
ain had become a Republic in 1930, but taring the
ensuing years troubles had rocked the republican experiment,
with wide oscillations in the political spectrum to both
extremes • The elections of February 1936 indicated that
Spain was still sorely divided but the ffrenta Popular , some-
what akin to the French Front Populaire , had gained a clear
majority in the Spanish Cortes . iftt increasing violence and
strife continued while the new government seemed unable to
control the situation. The murder of a Rightist leader
supplied the signal for an army revolt on July
,
|6«
The rebellion would have bees relatively insignificant in
history n*^ 1% failed or succeeded quickly. But Spain soon
found itself divided into two camps and the bloody struggle
continued for nearly three years as the battlefield of
ideologies and interests spread outside the borders cf Spain
itself,
e rebellion was only two days old when the Madrid
government called upon France for aid. In Paris, Slum and
his Foreign Minister were faced with the problem of whether
or not tc intervene militarily, give assistance or remain
neutral. Certainly, there was an ideological sympathy with
the Madrid government. But, on the other hand Blum was a
pacifist and had no desire to upset the peace of Europe,
His Popular Front foveroment was new, already beset he
domestic problems of the strikes, social reforms and currer
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stabilisation. Althr the French Cornrtunlst Party could be
expected tc ur*e assistance to the republican g-evernraent,
>encl t expectedly sided with General Franco as the
chcrapion cf the forces of "Order' against the forces
"Revolution . ' -* Significant sections of the French Centre
as well as the easily believed that the st
.
e in
Spr ' really i rrusade arsinst cosasmnism. This was the
stress of the propaganda organise 'Vrmeny and Italy. *'
There was even ratter of insurrection at home if Blu© shcu)
decide to he i Spanish republicans. French Fascist and
secret or~ani2ations, perhaps with the complicity of so-
h rani tray officers, were rutsored to have been pre-
paring for an uj*ri3ir.r.~
In his own ea1 to found that the Radicals
were f ~: sposed to aid the Spanish aent. Reportedly,
Foreign N ^Ibcs, alcr ;.h Chaut and Daladier,
reatened to resign unless an iiamediate emharro was plact
on shipments to <j>air.. other consideration was Great
Britain. Having followed the lead of Britain in the Rhine-
land crisis of March cf the sarae year, France had to consider
British rclicy in this new dilenasa. Blum* a decision on
August 1, 1936, was to propose to Italy and Britain that the
caud, 0£. cit ., r. 112.
3 ?Ibid
. , r. .
^Guerard, oj>. cit ., pp. i - ! .
9Dell, loc. cit .
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powers net intervene in the struggle i? in so as to let
both sides flrht it out without external ai ' . This prove.
be the first s I wedre Into the ranks of the Popular
Frc .
~me writers would have i Have that the Briti
Conservatives held the Blum government with contempt and
suspicion, . -itish Foreign Minister at
this time, stated that he had excellent relations with this
.r Frcrt VNOHM^ H. wre- at the rc.iev of non-
intervention was a French decision to which th
'ffice agreed.* As events unfoldc
,
itain became
the arch-i -cate of non-intervention* After Italy a
Germany had openly intervened in the war, Blum wrote in
rrent History that the French Government maintained its
Lley of non-intervention because?
; French Governs -id not wish to suggest a
divergence of opinion and conduct from t f Great
itain, since the Inglo-Frencl iance remains the
«cst important influer ropean peace,
^
.arly, France had surrendered her position as the dominant
power on the Contineat of Europe and in the reelm of forei
I ad totally surrendered leadership to Britai The
/'nth., r, Fai he Dictators (Boston: Hcv
iff! in Company, 1962)
,
p. klc . Compare with Del), loo.
cit.; a- am . hirer, Mid
c
entury Journey (New YorF:
Farrar, sand Young, 19 f
g£. cit., p. fc51.
^Leon Blum, Fre»C€ - erventic , rent
History , XLT? (flovewbei ) , r. ' .
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Communist Party in France was helpless to change this.
The rvi-t ;ricn likewise had its <iilemma. Etural
sympathies ley with cpular Trent ref ment
in '"pain but, as BcrVenau joints out, if Russian troops in
strength wer + pain end scored victories over the rebel
it might result in a rapprochement between Britain and
Oermany and between France and Italy against Pussia.
woul I constitute a revival of the Four Power Pact which
Stalin dreaded, mmx states that Stalin* 8 first reac-
tion was to involve France
For a time, the French Communist Party adopted a
careful attitude. The fear of civil war in France itself
was a moderating irf >e, Af 1 I e extant o in-
vention on th Italy and Germany became clf*ar, r ~.
warned or August 6 of the r of French encirclement
fascism. Henceforth, the Party made all efforts to aid the
nleh republicans by all means. The first tactic of tl
French Communist Party was to propose a Front Francais to
replace the Popular Front. Ttie plan would extend I rli-
amentary majority of the Popular Front ri^itward so as to
enable the French ^vernment, said the Communists, to execute
a more energetic, active foreirn policy which would prevr,
France from falling in with the plans of the British Tories
and Hitler.' e plan seems to have been an effort by the
44 ,
Borkenau, cr> cit. , p. 167.

Communists to find new friends not as pacifist as the
cis lists. *** Communist leaders Thorez and Cachin called
for sectirity of the Country and strict observance of the
^ts of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union and with
choslova! ie. The Socialists, however, held their
loyalty with the Popular Front while the Centre had no wish
for association with the Communists. The Front ?ranc&is
movement collapsed by ml d-ciept ember, 1936,
After the French embargo en war materiels to Spain
of t.urust , the French Communist Party increase efforts
tc aid the Loyalists in Spain. Os Hirust 13, 1936, the
Party addressed an open letter tc the Frenc lalists*
It is intolerable that we should watch the ret els
bein' plied sad Cerniany wJ the legal
lent of Spain sees a political blockade raided
f sanction . . . which, in spite
of international decisions was not rut into opm; -
tlon against Itaiv, although she was exility of in-
ve jrssii ia.
are of the opinion that i present situa-
tion it would be useful for our two parties to make
a common star in fa nlted international
action to support the Spanish people in their rlori-
ouf. H ht for liberty and peace. *•'
he Communists were unable, however, to reverse the
official st of the French Government. There is
^"Tauvet, or., clt. , p. 205.
46
'Hew Front in France, " Kejg Republic . LXXXVIIX
(Octcber 14, 1936), p. 26< .
Lllf^StSile* August 13 1 L936.
here is some evidence that the Soviet Government
was a little miffed with Blum on this issue. Ley Henderson,
cow, reported to -'ashin^ton on September 12,

6u
doubt, however, that limited aid did flow from France a;
through Prance to the Madrid government. Blum's own Air
Minister, "ierre Cot, admits to having dispatched thir'
reconnaissance planes and bombers, ftfl rursuit planes,
and about ten transport and training planes in the ear
days of the stri . t such aid fr • French Govern-
ment soon came to a halt after the siting of the tfon-Intc:-
vention Pact with the ctl r pewera * Subsequent aid to the
Loyalists from France, officii or unofficial, could i
begin to compare with the aid sent by Italy and Germany to
the rebel 8.
The French Communists, «] inr tike Blum
fcveroment for their parish policy, were nc to
1936, that 'oviet officials in private stated that France
led a leader ir than Blum, Tee Unit
ates Department of State! Foreign Rela tione of the Unitel
h: Government Printing Office, ),
Vol". I, p. 34*.
^Pierre Cot, Triumph of Treason, cited in Unit




( Part 1 , 8 action manist on
:
Government Printing Office! 1956) » p. » also David
^« 48a and tb ;]; Civil War (Berkeley?iversitv oT California' Press , 1953T» ¥"• %&» a!" 3t0R
rehil"
...-I. I of The 5_e;
£§r, 6 vols.; Boston; nouffhto flin Company, 1 ),
r. 214.
•'
i L3&* ci-- . ¥o: ttly different assess-
ment on the d*grQ9 of French aid, see Fdwat tt" r,
International Pelgtions Between the Two Worl d " rars 1919-3
S
.
(London: Facmillan mpany, Ltd., 1963)
,
p. 263.
Borkenau, o£. clt «
.
'-, implies that sore aid would have
reached republican Train had it not been for the constant
agitation of ' rench Communists for more a re eid»
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vot«> against the tfcveroment. fca appeal to emotions was at





September, 1936, f^aurice 'f'horez declared:
For the honor of the working class, for the honor of
i Popular Front , for the her..
;at is kilj efice must be lifted. 51
Towards the end of September, Therez visited f cscow
and reportedly discussed direct ai & by tba : cviet Union tc
the Loyalists. Thores is said to have ^Iven ! talin the idea
of the International Brigades, to he commanded by fcrei,
Communist refugees living in the Soviet Union. The idea was
adopted and Andre Warty was soon off to ~p&in with the
re^ronsibility for tr untcer Brigades, including 6*4
52French volunteers.
Gabriel Peri, the Party's spokesman on foreign
affairs end an editor of k'Kumenite, stressed the legalistic
and diplomatic aspects of non-intervention. He condemn^
the embargo of August g as a hostile act toward the • ih
Republic in violation of the Franco-: panish Treaty < 35.
He reminded his readers of the dangers to come if France
should h&v® three borders efend against fascism.*
Meanwhile, broad sectors of the Fren^ ht and
Centre came to believe that it was the Soviet Union which
^Editorial in I'Humanlte , Septem , 6.
^Feu -/-•' , oj> clt. , pp. $
a , Ccmmuniam and the French Intellect^.
[Hew fork; ?: slllan Company, l'?6L)~, p. 3 "
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was responsible not onlv for France's domestic and social
ills but for the ~Red r Civil War in Spain as weP . Indeed
the fovint t'nicn announced In ©r, 3 936, that she would
not be bound by non-1 rtervent ion in opsin if other viola-
tions—by Italy and Germany— did not stop.
France continued to be viewed I i non-Ccrasuni
world as being rro-Coimaunist. The ffaw Y' imss carried an
article on October L t 1936, which stated that there was no
secret that Britain wanted to know how France would react in
the event of a German-Bu<>sian conflict. -^ France, herself,
was de«plv annoyed with Soviet prora . The Congress of
I ftadice: fcy had voted a ^solution against
viet interv m in French affairs. ** Delbos, the Fore".
Minister, was particularly enAspicious of Soviet intentions.
He suspected that the Soviet Onion was attempting to i he
Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual mce as a cover for rev -
lutionary propaganda in France and elsewhere. The Frer
Ambassador to Moscow warn i " itvinov that I would be
a dead lettar if in France conti-
Delbos did not see® to view the Pact in terras of the problem
cf SvLrop&m securitv. Aecordinr to Ambassador tk
Franklin L. Ford and Carl K. ?chorske, Thi
in thf 1 Ferness r Robert Coulondre, ' The lUjp^nmats, ed.
Gordon '. Crai ! Felix Gilbert (Raw fork: " sum,
1963), p.
>h«m item in the Sew Tori 1^, October 4, 1936.
?ord and ;chorske, loc . cit .
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autohloprr only Plum, ftevnaud and Herriot jrave any rev
57impor' tr connections with the U.' . . R. On the
other hand, aud claims that Blum was i
strengthen the Franco-' ovist Pact because his party, the
siallst Party, was opposed to the idea of war.''
In this "ettin^, the French Communist Party and the
General 'eration of Labor co ass the Blum
Coveroaent to U .-cVade. Popular demonstrstic
were called and the Paris metallurgical workers went on
ike. But still the Communists and the . . . refus-
to »? andcn th<? Popular front* The Confederation expressed
its c um, and Thoress, for a tis:-
his criticism of ovemaent. But in another ch
taetict "iter :, \6 $ the Communists announced that
they would break m he Popular Front over the
** non-intervention policy,
On December 4 and 5$ a major foreign ? debate
took place in the Chamber of Deputies. Cabric & ain
stressed the implications of German and Italian Intervention
in Ppain upon the security of Prance. He urfrod the Deputies
safeguard the friendly" Spanish people, preserve democracy
eifeii ert Cculcndre, Do
lin a Hi tier: --enlrs de deux ambessades " -1939
rr . B , iST!-.
5
*Paul RaynaAid, In the TMc3
trans. Jamas D. Lambert fwtir xofv! Son ai ; cluster,
>), p.




and effect a huraaine peace." ^ Dalbos reiterated the
French foverrment's P of ron-intervention in Spa.i
He took not© of the anti-Communist fa-- s criticism of
Franco-coviet Pact but hastened to add that the Blum
government considered the Pact a pact of peace to which we
remain attached and political passions will destroy neither
the character r.or the value of it.
eaVing on December 5» Pfaurice There?, lamented the
^ish roller sf the government:
Hltl 4 Pus sol in i wish to cut off French Hor T
ktric re control of eosKnunice Lions in the
Mediterranean. Thev went to menace us directly from
? sou* .
He quoted Hitler* s words from ffein Kampf , "Isolate Francs to
annihilate i*-. ay that the French Communist
Party, "since the begia , has opposed and it remains
Opposed to all military intervention, indirect,
the affairs " . ^
the same da
,
fore the vote of confidence came
before the group, the Party reversed its previous decision
to break away from the government and announced through
c*oues Duclos that the Party would simply abstain fro® the
6L
vol.'.* . ipuler Frc rained formally intact.
^2d riciel, Dohats Parlementaire , ambre
des Deputes, fession Extraordinaire de , l Qecembre,
6lIbid . , p. 3?r . 62Ibid . , p. 3364.
63IMd ., p. 65* 64Tbid . , | . " - 74.
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• Spanish ClviJ War continued its bloody course as
sia, having decisied tervene but r sriously,
poured hundreds of "advis into Spain. Indeed, 5c let
agents were li fcftleta ge of military operations on the
Madrid fro: fly early 1937, German and Italian intervention
had assumed sue*, rroportiens that victory for the Franco
forces seemed assured. ( aid began to taper off, but
bs aid did continue, perhaps in the hope of drawing off
66
Italia- and German energies for aa lon# as possible. In
other developments, the l&to*IerHtl Axis of October 1
formalized the Italian-Ger --ation in Spain. In mid-
193?, Japan Began her undeclared war against China. Musso-
lini formal i?,ed his break with Hie democratic a?
withdrawing I •s'-ue of Katlers in r-ecember of that
same <paar after signing the Ant | -'. -.^intern ^act with Germa.
and Japan. "in seemed to be pursuing a
67
for- Icy of 'watchful waiti? .
I France- '.let Pact o r al Assistance centIn-
in effect but without military conventions, without teet
Soviet Ambassador Potemfcin made an attempt to give the Pact
a militav "tent %d*en he met Blum in Fe": y$ 19' i
^BorKen.u, oj, cit., P . 16*.
P. Kennan, 3cvlpt Foreign foil
(Princeton : .• .: D. -'an Nostrand Company, Inc., I960),
p. " .
^C-eorge F. Kenn<~ -sala and the tfest lender Lenin







like the attempt of I it 'ay when \m
and Del it came to naught. 6 The fotaeh Ccvernment was
too weak, toe embarrassed bv the Pr*neh reswimtits i 00
sur * to British disar' i , utd too hesitant tr




erne, Leon Blum continued to have his domestic
problems. ^ry, ared a pause 4 in
further progress toward social reform. To both Communis
and toalftlists, this caused embarrassment to their leai*
ship since bv this time left Extremists—Anarchists, Revolu-
tionary I eniniats or Trotskyism, some trade unions within
the CO.' .. I even the Revolutionary left of the Soeif
Partv— cl&mcred for more radical measures, fuch pressure
frequently foresd the Communint t*B\ I the C.0. r;* 1 - ader-
ship to play up to *-.he extremists for fear of losin
leadership cT the wor^ine class or I -iced as T, the
**^s of capital—or t r Stalin. the Communis
3*loff, ox. cit. , Vol. T, pp. 92-93.
-Right wing Deputy "enri de Ferillis is as
aayinr before the Chamber, "We will accept the France-
Pact wher there are no longer seventy-twr es
as of the Frev r. Cited in Micaud, op .
cit . . p, 3
erth, The Front Por.ulaire in rifficul-
ties," Foreign Affairs * XV (July 193?) • I • 6-617. Another
;cr who agrees" tKat the Communists h&<\
cated parliamentary action rather than ti. rect action aa
advocated by the Trot 0*1 1, £>^. cit . » . 1?.
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were equally careful not tc frighten away seetie the
peasantry and jaiddle class which were i iered na-cessary
their own ort and rent.
phers cleim that it was indeed the Communis,
applied the brakes' to the domestic Popular Front fi -
am. Bcrkenau blames the Radicals and the Communists f<
blcr ructural reforms and strict controls on ;
•concmy &r I the currency.
By June, 1937, the fli f capital frost France,
the depletion, old reserves and the stagnation of the
economy led Blum 1 % government to reverse its policies end
pt a policy cf controls aid restraint*:, ~lum requested
full financial powers. To this the Communis ts rallied, and
even offe**ed to participate in the g islcn
* 1935 to the contrary. The Central Committee had
decided*
In the presence of the furious assault re*ctl<
te Cor res Itself ready to ta^e up
all the responsibilities in a foverr strengthened
ar Front for
I 3&lvation of France, democracy and p^ace. •'
the Chaaber of Deputies voted be powers
he request m more c •vativ ate refused. &*
\ate, it seems, was not as enthusiastic for the Popular
Front as was the major! e CharaV-er. 31 urn's tic >rs





-*Cited in F&uvet, o£. clt . , r. ZLZ,

6S
called the terete very conservative
picicus of rampant revolutionaries^
Communist Parties, V nate would rive easrrenev powe
to a 0*1*41 - a Blum. A« a consequence, Slum
resigned and, on June 22, , the -adical- "ccialist Oemille
Chauteaps became Premier of a new Popular Fro -ernae
with Blum aa Deputy Premier. The Communists pledged their
support to hi the measure in which he will assure fc
defense of social gains****
V. CHAUTT
Chautemps had already headed two governmenta for
short periods before comi power is June, . He was
destined to head two more before f-'arch, 193 .
wants in this latter period were pla/rued by domestic problems,
mainly financial, and France's position in world affairs
continued to decline, the Spanish question continued as a
lively issue* 'Vhautssps stood firm on the policy of non-
intervention, although his motive seems to have been different
from that of Blum, He told Ambassador Bulllfc on October 22,
193? » that no French army would be ser«t to Spain nor m
Prance open her frontier to supplies for Spain because the
result would be the "condemnation of the French ;
s world for cooperation with Sola? ^r
'^Fraser and ffatensor, c£. clt . , | .
7*;
Cited in Fauvat, or. * -

69
defeat of the aide which the French were supports - g# *•
General weaVness in forei v/ea Indicated by heavy
reliance upon Great Britain. Reportedly, maintaining int£
the British guarantee of France's frontiers was thf
77
of French foreign policy.' Foreign Minister Yvon
Delbos, held over from the Blum cabinet, made a lonr tour
of Eastern European capitals, with the notable except-lor
cow, in r, IS' The rssulta were very disappoint-
ing due to the considerable deterioration of the position of
France since the remilitarization of the Hhlnelai
In January, 1937* a series of mas.** arrests and
trials known as the it" began in the - oviet Union, The
execution of many Old Guard Communists ar e thousand
officers and officials was viewed with shocV throughout the
world and with consternation in the British and French
General Staffs. some extent, the French Communist Party
was embarrassed and weakened by the trials, but not seri-
ously.' The French intellectual extreme left was certainly
not materiel: illlusioned* Tnere was, however, a
'^tini apartment of State, Forei/
.
ti- e United States 1937 (Waal Ooverome
frlnt: ^ice, p. 1.
Tbid., p. IT .
lorton *abb, "lew Deal: French Style,' Current
7
) , p. 50. cdatlons
tates 1,93^ » vol* I, t. . , i ire Mauroia,
Paradox of"Trench" Communism, Currei fi9JX» ^H (Novem-
ber 1931"), p. 2 •
>ute, 2£. cit. , p. 3T .

perceptible attempt by the French Cosmauri to dis-
associate itself from the 3-on 3 Soviet Union*
In a speech delivered on December 26, uricc Thorez
took care to assert the independence of France and, by
implication , of the French Communist Far'
?e must take its cue neither from Bat** m
Berlin, nor n, ncr Moscow, for which we do not
conceal our feelings of admiration ap4 affection.
It must be from Paris, our capital.
There s went on to list; those instances when France
trayed her Mission' : the siting of the Four Power Pact of
193";- the toleration ssclini*n conquest of II /-
are of Locarno with the remilitarisation of
the Ehinel&nd, I fkade of republican Spaii . ^"In order
to accompli wr mission in the world/ it said:
franc puretse a democratic forei; eh
reflects on an international scale the changes fet
about in our cpyntry as a result of the People's
Fron •
this democratic foreign policy would con
the followin
1. Prance must return to reliance on the League of
tlona for security and for dealing with 1
sion,
2, A new basis of Franco-British relations had to
be established*
\urice There 2, France of the People's Front m
Its Mission In the &orld (lew f&nrs "Library, 193$)
,
81 Ibid , . pp. 6#* 77-7*.

71
There must be increased Francc-*merican collat-
ors* especially in the Far ?ast.
4. The defenders of collective necurity in Central
encourt*
Democracy and liberties must be restored in
ustria.
6. France must prove her attachment tc
viet Pact.
French diplomatic rrsrsenrel must be democratized
so e -.heir practice of colli le
abroad that the People's front is an accident,
a transits Foreign
Minister, /lexis Lerer, would have them -/e. *
In 193£, Thcres p\ la boo** 3 which was part
eutoMo^rerhy and part Communist TV >rm, nie of
the items contained in the book are w< of consideration
in the studv of the Party's foreign policy* For instance,
Thore* warned that Germany was trying to win SfegLand over to
her side ty such tactics as the Anfrlo-German Naval Ace
Just as ' ^o-Itaiian agreement or trie status of the
Mediterranean had aided the Fascists in destroying the
anish Ri e Communist T*arty, wrote Thorea,
stood for - *rventlon in the internal affairs of other
rlea, but or, the other hand, France could not ne
Fascist interference. Contractual agreements must he ob-
ser the League Covenant Sttst Ye respected; pact", of
Ibid., y , ~ |,
aurice Theres, Son of the Peorle * trsr . uglaa




mutual assistance, following, ths principle of the Franco-
act, must be concluded by peace-loving states.^
The League of Nations must again open the questions of the
I tale-German agression against Spain and the Japanese
invasion of China. France must proclaim publicly at Geneva
her proposals for enforcing international law in the Far
B.st »d in V/.,t.ra Euror*. 8*
As 193? drew to a close , the Party held its ?«inth
Congress at Aries, December £5*19* It proved to be the
e*»
summit of the Party's history to date. Kemt p was up
an all-tiir, h of 34Q»OOQ of whom over 11
,
were in
the Paris region alone. The Cantonal elections of October
had confirmed the success of the Popular Fron The Com-
munis ts might have been en^cyinf th: oss, but in the
meantime, Chautemps was having increar difficulties with
the Socialists as well as the Communists. The situation was
about to come to a head.
In January, Communist Deputy Ramette
announced on the floor of the Chamber that althc Com-
munists were afainst the pending measure on exchange cl
,
they would not vote against the measure in order to preserve
the I r Front. They would abstain. Chautemps, annoyed
at the Communists because of a new wave of strikes in Decem-
ber, shouted bacV tl,at the Communists could have their
* 5lLLl-» PP* 2U-215.
e6,





liberty end not be a part of the government majority at all.
This direct slap at the Popular Front was too much for t
cialists, who resi from the gramme' tag down
Ch«t«ps.
It took four days before Chautempa was called to
form a new government. In the meantime* I eon Dlum attempt
to sp< a national Government, built around the Front
Ponulaire but expanded to the Right, £e There* J Raynaud.
The Comamr.ists were willing tc this arrangement on con-
dition that the Popular Front program still be applied.
This move led reporter Alexander Vilerth to t at the
links between the French Communists and Moscow are flimsier
an is r*?neraily belie\'e . He based his statement on
repeated remarks by Thores that the Communist Party was
wiilinr i»d ready to cooperate with the democrat rces cf
the c -y to achieve the possible rather than hold out for
what would be ideal*
91b**a plan failed, however, because Raynaud's
party, the Alliance Damperatique » vetoed the idea, and be-
cause many of the Radicals were against ha\ policy
'dictated cow. :*e Radicals, concerned with
' axander Wert}., . Chautemps Cries f '\olf f ,
Current 193^), p. 25, and Fauvet, e£.L
^Fauvet, o£. pit . , r. 221.





respectability, were no Ion pular Front enthusiasts.
knd so, en January 18, 193 £, Chautemps formed a new govern-
ment without Socialist participation^ and with greater
orientation to the The following sent ;autemps
explained his reasons to the American Ambassador for reject-
ing a National Government as suggested In if
Estionel Government, Chsutemps would ina is t on the Communists
bein<» excluded because "they would report every conversation
to Stalin. Besides, the British, he said, were opposed to
Communists in the French Government. n the other hand, he
*gr**& $ a government of Hadicals and the light would be
menaced constantly by strikes if it did not follow a polic
approved in make it more difficult , Blum wci>
refuse to join the government if ft >mmuniats were ex-
cluded.'^ Clearly, Chautemps and his colleagues believed
th/ ? French Communist Party had the country bogged down.
Chautemps 1 new government lasted only six and a half
weeks. It wes marked by an interesting disagreement between
the Communists and the Socialists, It seems that the
Socialists refused to rive Chautemps the full powers whi-
ne requested. The Communists thought this action premature
and cssti'st ocielists for hindering a firm French
foreirr policy, for by this time, the Communists were vitally
of
93Beloff, o£. cit. , Vol. I, p. 1
9%nited States Department of
-Jjr
' *&« gnite*: j ashir i Oovernaetxt
; 75mce , '19 >TT, ' 1*ol . TT p. 24.
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earned with foreign affaire and were preoccupied wi
ting tip air and naval forces and with reinforcing the
Frr•••.- oviet Pact. Domestic concerns could take second
place. In the atmosphere of the impending Austrian crisis,
Chautemps resigned on March 10, I
bier's i -ration of Austria took place
March .1 ^eraan troops ©arched into Vienna,
France, which since £ been the centsr of power on the
tinent of i and the r of its most powerful
army, was without a government for the second time that
calendar year. In 1935 Franca could have acted when Germany
announced rearmament. In 1936 France at least debated
within the cabinet the course of action to take in response
to the remilitarisation of the Hhineland. But in 193$,
France had ne government in the time of crisis.* It was
not the Communists who were to blame f^r the lacV of Franc
initiative but, mere correctly, the enemies of the Comim
iats who were so fearful of the bogey of the "Red Fenace"
and revolution within France that they rendered, or at least
helped to render, the Fre cdy politic incapable of
^Fauvet f oj> clt . , p. 222.
^%aurice Thoras, later in the b, caused an
audience to hiss and boo Chautemps "for resigning rather than
face 1 iriar crisis. tee news item in the law York
Times . ftarch 20, I 16«
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stability, consistency and concerted action, There was not
even a debate in the Chambers on this new crisis. 0elb<
reportedly proposed a tourh demarche against Germany by
Britain and Prance, but only as a sop to the Popular Prort,
that is, for domestic consumption only.
^hile the Deputies searched for a new foverament,
Gabriel Peri editorialized in tVHtaianite r
rope risks paying with her blood for the tragic
error of these who have not listened to our warning*
. . . The last hope can and should be saved.
franc va herself without deli. rnaer
oteralned to practice a democratic and Franc
forej .^
the fall of Chautessps, Bluia again brought forth
t ides of a Rasaemt lenient National , this time encoapaasir
more of the Right, de Thores a Marin. Only the outspo?
Fascists were to be excluded. On the very day of lass,
Blum addressed representatives of all parties of the Right
in defense of forcing a government to include the Ce®aunists:
Let me say this: in case of war you av® to
bills* the Communists as m else* The Com*
munists, after all, represent 1,500,000 workers,
peasants and small tradesmen. Ycu have no right to
throw them out.^^
9 wrote in the fall o e last
eighteen months, there has been only one proper foreign
debate at the Chamber—on February 25 and 2 . , after
the fall la Alexander Worth, fter the
lar Fror ; ^s , 1YXI ( Octobe . 20.
^Foreign Relations of nited States
I, p. 25.
Lted in Fauvet, on.. Pit.,
*» ^«rt ;iU^fat of France, p.

He went on to remind them that the Communists and th<
would be needed to speed up armament production. Blum
stressed his independent course of action dur v e Spanish
question despite Communist pressure and promised the
his continued independence from foreirn veto. Paul fteynaud
*gr*f t is who enters Vienna today and who
will menace Pra^me tomorrow. It is HitlerV
But Farin, the leader of the party et the right end
of the proposed National Government, was opposed. So too
was Flandin, a former Premier snd Foreign Minister, who felt
that the entry of the Communists into any French ^©verament,
however, National, would "deeply shocV Mr, Chamberlain
cause a break wit' ' armore, he believed
{Germany and Italy would be openly hostile.** In short, I
Sight, with the exception of Keynaud and the Christian Der
crats who disapproved of Hitler's treatment of Catholics,
was unimpressed with the gravity of the international situa-
tic aeeer >» , s appeal for a National Ocvemmer
Domestic affairs had to come first. Albert Guerard, an his-
torian critical of the French Right, later wrote?
The Conservatives, who had lonr claimed a r; ly
f patriotism, were thinki- their social and
economic privileges, not the national interest. . . .
They saw everywhere in Europe a contest between
xIbld., pp. 15&*
2Fauvet, c£. cit . , p. 223, citing Paul Heynaud,
Ifgaeirea , Tome 2.
Twilight of France, -pp. 15&-159.

communism and fascism, and they urhesit; pre-
ferred fascism: most literal! 1
, ^r
than Blum!
arch 13, 193$ i Blum succeeded in forming a
government of Socialists and Radicals, the last Popular
Front government. It was destined to last less than a aor
trets 14, Blum solemnly pledged to the Csech
Minister in Paris that Prance would honor her commitments to
C2echoslovalia in ease of further G^rmn expansic .
days later, he out Lined before the Chamber of Deputies his
plan® for accelerated rearmament, refore,
before all else, to prepare for the perils of the situation
abroad. The Coaaaunist Partv &rre&d. In the same Chamber
a week later, Florimend Bonte spoke in the name of the
he Communist Party] wij tH for prepara-
tions] because it does not war country to know,
the event of aggression, the immense dangers of
improvisation > be placed in th* ssibili*
of organising and preparing all the national re-
sources effectively, proj I rapid:
It will votr is measure because it wants
to T.he French people in a state t< at vic-
ly, from the very first day, the a^cression
which will try to impair the national in ience
and integrity, and fto prevent} devastations an$
death across the rich provinces of our cc
let Union, likewise reacting to t. schluss,




vcurns' Defeats Pari amen taires, Chambre
das Deputes,
-
" ' Lcn Ordinaire de 193^ » 17 t'ars, . .i6.
^MdM 24 Mars, p. 956.

the United States and the U.S.t.H. be called to discuss
possible implementation of the Franco-Soviet Fact within the
League framework in the event of further threats to the
peace by Germany.' Tlie proposal died,
Blum* s Foreign Minister was J* Faul- fx:nccur, a long*
time enthusiast for the League of Nations. Under his she
stewardship, France's foreign policy assumed a novel force-
fulness and direction, He reiterated Blnm's guarantee to
Caechoslc akia end sounded out France's Eastern allies,
includi- Soviet Orion, on their view* regarding future
Herman agression , especially in the light of French alli-
ances With Vcland, the little Entente and the Soviet Union.
And to the delight of the Communists, ho relaxed the embargo
on munitions to Spain. I was furious' at this turn of
•vents* Britain no desire to commit herselt to guaran-
tees in Eastern Tv<rcp$* The French Right, toe, objected to
is energetic foreim poller and their criticise hea
tributed to the fall of Blim's new government.
At home, Blum's second cabinet was hit with another
wave of strikes, the moat serious since 1936. For over two
weeks, not one aircraft was produced to help rebuild the
French Air Force. The workers were again t. advent*
i
ill, ££• Clt. , \* ?-%.
%aul A. Qa . France Since 17?
'9 , {New York: Kar
and 6l)
, p. 4:
ord snd Schorake, 0£» c
,
lt . , p. 5&4»
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of the Socialist Premier as they had in 1936 because they
believed him to be the least likely Premier to deal harsh:.
with the strikers. On the other hand, the French managerial
class were unhelpful and uncompromising too. They had not
accepted labor-management bargaining as a two-way street.
Itoey had not recognised the rirbt of labor to have a legi-
timate voice in the economy, ner, as a rule, did they con-
sider the rravity of tha international situation severe
enough to sooth their piques feelings over the Mati^on
cements or the labor policies of the Popular Fro
Reportedly, many employers, even in tha most important
branches of Industry, chose to observe strictly the forty-
hour week rather than accept additional orders which would
involve payment of overtime md the hiring of additional
workers. xu
Ulian the Senate again rejected Bliss's request for
financial powers, Blum's second cabinet fell on April 8,
193$. The Popular Front governments had come to an end. In
the freewheeling democratic society that was France, with
finite limitations on her power and resources, it proved
simpl uible to execute vi porous social reforms (which
cost nicney) and at the same time initiate an intensive re-
armament. Trance simply could not have guns and butter.
Coupled to the financial problem was that of fo; polic
"einz Pol, Suicide c,f a. pemocrgc- , - Heins
and an {Hew York: Revnal~and Hitchcock, 19*0),
p. 267.

"ferences oJf opinion on fore; , especially
regarding the Spanish Civil War, freetly widened the breach
between Left and Right ^hich in turn gave domestic politics
a ©.ualit" of ideological fanaticism and contributed to the
ning of democratic foundations of government and the
•oral disarmament of France* 11
In the entire era of the Popular Front, the Commun-
ists could not claim one significant for policy victor
Sever did they prevail upon Prance to take a course of
action which was favored ty them or the Soviet Union.
Rather, their presence helped the working classes embark on
a series of strikes which blackened the Communists' reputa-
tion still more and convinced many tliat any dealings with
the Russians was dangerous* The blood bath in ' !pain was
seen as a preview to what would happen in France if the
Communists, indeed the Popular Frcnt, became too powerful.
The only influence which the Communist Party cou\d exert
that atmosphere was detrimental to the Sovi ion if ftl
was pursuing a policy which looked toward collective security
as the answer to the threat frv ler. After nearly two
years of the Popular Front, the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935
remained ineffective. In France, few 1 e Cosssunists
would touch it because of the howl of criticism it would
stir up.
13
-Robert . eton- n. from lenin %o Va^enjkrrv:
Biston oi World Communism (New To: Traderiek 1. PraeFer,
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France was indeed weaker Internally at the conclu-
sion of the Popular Front years. Part of this was due I
the world economic ills which had reached Prance rather late
but were still equally present in most parts of the la
trial world. As for France* s inner dissention and polarisa-
tion cf its political spectrin, the Communist Party was on?
partis ]y to blame. The cause ari Ration was a
force ;?cted by any political party, ttte Communists
and the Socialists were simply present in the environment
and pulled or the end which their «t: c and social
philosophies had tauf sflu The Communists were vocifer-
ous; they preached radical ideas. But the i those
who disagreed with the Communists were equally vehement and,
all too often, advocated radical solutions to- . was the
peculiar nature of the fofflttHntstS w' fclw scared
the French people and the drench QpfanHMUt Into doing




Less than seventeen months after Blum's secor
gcver fell, France was at war with Germany. During
this interval, neither the aliste nor the Communists
were part of the Daladier cabinet, although in many instance.?
they voted with the governmer . The general tenor of rela*
tions with regard to Germany were at once mildly firm, then
appeasing, the: firm* Regarding the Soviet Union, the tenor
ran from censideration, to insult, to mild interest, to dis-
gust. Britain continued to lead a3 France hunf to her arr
str The French Communist Party was nothing more than a
nuisance to the government because its prime activity was
crying in the wilderness about a menace whiv. Ither France
nor Britain cared to believe in uni. was too late. y
Frenchman today would agree that the influence of the French
"'arty in this period was regrettc 11, except
of ccur- at the Party still frightened people away.
I. SALADIFH AUD KT
On April 10, 193# > Edovard Daladier, the Radical
wstron^ man,' well educated and a patriot trusted by the
General Staff, became Premier and Geo mnet his Foreign
lister. ~he Sociallata did not participf the
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government which, like the Chautempa government of , was
oriented more tc the Right than previous Popular Front
rments. Cn April 12, Daladier was granted full fins, -
cial powers, effective until July 31, The Communi oted
in favor of this measured Inese emergency powers were on
the first of several to be given the Daladier government
before the outbreak of the war. Indeed, in June 19
Daladier sent the Parliament on a holiday to la3t until t
fall so as to avoid any unpleasantness with the Communists
on the still unresolved Spanish problem and w. ie
Socialists and the Communists on the problem of old sfe
pensions.'
longer part of the government majority, the Fro?
Communist Party continued its fight for stemming the exp<
sion of Nasi Germany. The Hhineland had been recccupied m
Austria annexed. Hitler had announced that he had no further
territorial desires in the West. After Austria, Sudeten
Czechoslovak ie t Meael, Dansig and the Polish Corridor seemed
to be next. Increasing pressure by Germany on Czechoslo-
vakia caused new alarm in Moscow. This alarm was reflected
in the publications of the French Communist Part
%ax Beloff , the Foreign Folicv c
1929-1%! ft< ""HFT N~ess, 1^47-T^9j , Vol.
lYTpTr
*Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communis te Frai
c
,
sia (Librairie Artheme Fayard , ) , vol. I, p. 2
lexander Wert ar the Popular Front," Forei
Affairs . XV7~ ( October 19?

9 abandon Czechoslovakia ia to compromise the
peace, rike a direct Mow at the security of
our country, France, to open for Hitler the w
: is, the route to southed
Is that the desire of those of our patriots who
counselling us to tear up the pacts whic
France to Czechoslovakia?^"
In Fay, 193 t % when the Czechs erroneously suspected German
action ir connection with their municipal elections and
called for partial mobilization, the French Communists pro-
posed that a motion of sympathy be addressed to the Oover -
atent of Czechoslovakia in the name of al.i parties of the
Popular Front. The Seelalistf r<^d Radicals refused.
The French alliance with Czechoslovakia still existed.
But en this alliance bin rid the operatier
Csech Alliance. In a conversation on **ay 12, 1 -*ith
Litvinov, Bonnet asked whet the Soviet attitude would fee
in the event of a conflict between German' ! Czechoslo-
vakia, litvinov replied that if Frmce fulfilled her obli-
gation, the . . . would do likewise. stioned on
•/ the Soviet Government would or could aid Czechoslovakia
If Poland mid Eumania objected to the passage of Soviet
forces, Litvinov acknowledged the problem and said it was
up to France, which had treaty obligations with Poland and
Rumania, to secure their consent. Bonnet was of the opinion
that Rumania would oblige, but in later talks ho found her,
^Jaar Bruhat, La "checoslcvaque et i'equilibre
european," Cahiers Ichevi?me , Way-June 193?, ?• 151.
5




as well as FoJsnd, obdurately 0] : •:
Later the same month, Bonnet reflected the feara of
the Daladier government in making siilitary arrangements wi
the Soviets. Any prospect of Soviet mill •. , he
told his Ambassador to Moscow, ml^fct 'incite certain French
elements to appear bellicose, Nevertheless » en June 12,
IS aladier renewed Elian 1 s pledge of ?• arch 14, declaring
that France*s obligations to Chechoslovakia were sacred,
and cannot be evaded.* Two days earlier, Maurice Thorez,
who had already referred to Czechoslovakia as the last
pillar of democracy in Central Europe, proposed to c Ue
the World Peace against the Fascist threat. It would con-
sist of 'the great democratic nations: England, Czechoslo-
vakia, Spain isicj, the Soviet Union and also the United
stea, Mexico and China.
e British Government, upon wl.om the French Govern-
ment so much relied, was of the opinion that the military
situation was such that neither France nor Great Britain
would be able to prevent Germany from overwhelming Czecho-
slovakia even if Russian help was secured. The purges of
W* £S> pit . , Vol. II, p. 131.
^Franklin L. Ford and Carl F. Schcrske, ce
in the wilderness: Houbert Coulondrs,"* The Diplomats. , ed.
Gordon A. Craig ar,:i Felix Gilt ew torkl Atheneiaa,
ftl, P. 55^.
^..'instc- rehill, The gathering Stc: 3. I of




^. cit . , - 6.
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193&-193? were judged to have vastly red the fi^hti:
capability iie Pad Amy. Furthermore, thore was the
problem of fceoprraphy. The D.S. .' . ; - : o common bordar
with Csechoalovafrig, Poland was completely opposed to the
passa.re of Russia? ps while fcumsnia condescended to
tolerate the passage of Russian aircraft or . The F
Cover was placed ir the dilemma of taking the initiative
of action or following the wake of British decisions. Within
the government and among the people, opinions were dia-
metrically opposed, The French Ambassador to Moscow, Robert
Coulon ire, constantly urged his governse* a closer
agreement with the Soviet Union. Interestingly enough, it
was the Csech Ambassador in Moscow who told Coulondre that
the his government had been informed in Faris that the French
Government would not follow up Franco-Soviet military con-
versations at that time because such conversations might
offend the susceptibilities of the Iftgliali Conservatives.*1
Sc in the snd, Britain led the way and France follow*
Both governments notified the Cseehs that unless they yielded
to the demands of the Sudeten Germans, the Csech Government
would be left to face Germany unassist* France, in effect,
was denouncing her alliance with CsechoslovaVia.
10R.ane Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic Hlatorv
Barop c« the Confess of 7ieKr/a law jorki Harper and
.
11Ford and Sefec ._. cit
. , p. $67 % c ct
Coulcndre, De St.allae a* Hitler: de deux ami
J226-1222 (FIris, 1950T, p. 157.

ithin France, the brewing Czech crisis was spli -
tinp France into two fanatical Frances, each ni ecoraing
more and mere extreme.-1 " Tnere was peace party faction
and the war party faction; those who favored peace at any
price and those who favored a policy of firsineas and resist-
ance. >r.ti-joviet prejudices and a complacent belief in the
strer: F the peace front gave aid and comfort to the
appeasers. They were openly opposed to what was perhaps the
only measure to sare Prance: a military agreement with the
U*S.S.R. In a sense, then, the French Right, aa Kicaud sc
had to accept the possibility of war wfci posing the
best conditions fcr victorr.'^-*
B France who stood for resistance and firm-
ness were called b<3lliciste > and L* Human! te had the reputa-
tion of being the ?reat belliciste newspaper in Ceptember,
193$ * Its editorials or foreign affairs, written by
Communist Deputy Gabriel Peri, were habitually well reasoned
and unusually well documented,^ On September 20, follow! 5
i2?dmcnd Taylor, Th£ :r trategy of Terror : gurppeVs
Inner Front (Boston: Houghton Fi'fflinTonp any .1940), p. 3$.
^Charles icaud, The Franc I
Germany -1939 (New York: "Sctagon Books, Inc. ,1^4),
p. 221.
UAlexander Iv'erth, The Twili^it ,nce 1*33-1 ^.. ,
ed. with an Introduction byH7 . ' :• an I ew Yco "Harper
«ad ) p. 200.
15Ibii. Peri waa shot as a by the Germans
in the end' of 1941*
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the Berehtes,eaieo meeting between Hitler and Chamberlain and
the subsequent Anglo-French discussions in London, L* Human! te
sneered:
iuncti of Hitler, M. Chamlerlain
has lust de* , for -xA French minis-
ters, \\ lie dismemberment of Czechoslovakia whose
ir^ "ty is insepar from the security of France
and the peace of Europe. 1 ^
On September 19 or 2G» Banes is said to have ques-
tioned the Soviet Minister to Prague on whether the Soviet
0nion would honor the Sovlet-Csech pec . The answer was
affirmative, I second question a Russia's advice in
the event Trance dishonored her paet. The Soviet reply was
that Csechosicv&l.is should appeal to the Las
I an aggressc. ....
would come at once to the assistance of the Czechs whatever
the other powers might do. '
Before this reply reached the C^ech cabinet, the
Czechs decided on the hfc of Sepiefcb* -21, I to
accept th< o-French proposals and entrust the fate of
their nation to Great Britain and France. 1^ n Chamberlain
saw Hitler on September 23 at Oodesber tier upped his
demands and Chamberlain returned home, the crisis still
unresolved. In Paris, Gabriel Peri pleaded in t ' Human! te
16Editoriel in t'Htmanlte . September T
,
i7Beloff, o£. ci£. , Vol. 3 T -T
^"George Vamadaky, A History of
]
5th «.
New Hav^ ie University fro- 7> p.
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for Britain and France to hold fast to the line of resist-
ance. ^ In Geneva, Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov,
addressin? the Iea/nie of Nation* Assembly c- tember 23,
heaped shame on the Western powers. The French and the
Ctecha, he stated, had preferred two bilateral pacts; the
fr*r • - let Pact ani the Soviet-Caech Pact, rather than a
mu -
- teral pact of the three. He noted the provision®
P th* Soviet-Czech Pact aid to
Chechoslovakia If fcrattea first rendered assistance. He
went
Thus the Soviet Government had nc c ns to
Chechoslovakia in the event of French indifference
to an attach on her. In fc&at event, the tat
Government might come to the aid of Czechoslovakia
only in virtue of a dar i by the League of
Nations. *^
September 25, anlte demanded the resigna-
tions of Oaladier and Bonnet "who lost their heads on 12
tember and hated France after 21 September. The Commun-
ist press called Hitler's new demands an ultimatimr and
1Q
Cited by David Caute, Communism and the Fre,





^Jane Desras |«i.), Soviet Documents on Forei^
Po Iicy (Oxford University Press / Y953T7~"^c>l • " ^T» FF« 30U-
305, citing league of j , it
1^9, p. "flecffiir. Fenr.an,
Lenin aj lin (Hew Tor' oT" id
Literature, 1962), p. 305, belie scow's pre-^unich
expressions of devotion to Czechoslovakia actually 'cost
icow very little* and should not be construed es an overly
heroic ac^ er part. On the other hand, this at -otes
the agreement between the official statements of T< and
the utterances of the French Communist Party.
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bagged the French and British leaders to I later to another
advocate of resis ins ton Churchill • ^*
After the apparent impasse of September 23 » Mussolini
seized upon a proposal of Chamberlain and suggested that a
meeting be held in Munich with representatives from Britain,
France, Germany and Italy to settle the Csech problem.
Soviet Russia, who had a Pact of Mutual Assistance wi'
Ciechoslovakia, was not onlv not invited, but was not even
informed beforehand of the impending conference. On the
git of September 2 - . f 1936 » Chamberlain, Daladier and
Mussolini handed over to Hitler the Cudeten Province of
Ciechoslovakia* the Four Power Pact, although never rati-
fied, had in fact become the directorate of Europe* Chamber*
lain returned home to Britain an Anglo-German declara-
tion of rood will and words about peace in our time.
Daladier, who was not the appeaaer that was Chamberlai
feared the wrath of Frg a returned to F&rla* In-
stead, he was greeted with wild rejoicing and us i asm.




Following the Funich crisis, the French Communist
Party stood apart for its opposite the acta da hi
:1Fauvet, o£. jgit






accomplished at Munich, Or er 1, Thoret, Cachin ar
s ••nt a raessa?e of sympathy to the Csech par pi a ar
tha Csech Communist Party rerrettin^ their humilia' efore
'ler. icisra by tha Party greatly embarrassed tha
French Government, parhapa seriously impinging vpon its
conscierce. Foreign Minister Bonnet confessed to United
States Ambassador Bullitt on October 3 that he and Daladier
hoped that new alt s could be held socn S« that the
troublesome Communists could be eliminated comrl from
the government majority* Bonnet moaned that it was "impos-
sible to produce a revival in France so lon^ as every life
«M dependent or, Coaawist vcte*.'^
In tha Chamber of Deputies o ober 4, Oabriel
s
Peri had this to say about the Munich aoreemer
Messieurs, our last discussion on foreign policy
was after the annexation cf Austria. Since that
event, the map of Europe has been revis ier the
menace and we dispose today, in a quarter of an
hour, to express our opinion on this subject, ft
hop? have to sanction, in a little while, by
standing or sitting [to indicate our vote], the ? .
approval cf a new die tat or a new coup de force .^
Feri went on to warn the members of the Chamber of the
dangers inherent in the Munich settlement. He stressed that
^Fauvet, o£. cit.
, p. 236.
*^tnite i Department of State, Forei jg»
tiong cf the Uni ainrtor: Government
frTnt Tice, 195117 X* P- •
• ^Journal Official , Debats Farl ementaire




Hitler's domination of Czechoslovakia was a step in the
direction of the Rumanian oil fields. The entire Tittle
te and the Balkans, he said, vere threatens
later that same day, the Chsaaher erutiss d
tin »rnme a vote of confidence over the Munich erree-
ment by the vote of 535 t , with 3 abstentior . "prosed
were the Communists, one Socialist and that conservative
nationalist, Henri da fferillis. 2?
ccialists were isov r away fro® tJ
nunists. In that same vear, at the Socialist Party con-
vention at. Nantes, Paul Fsure defeated Leon Blum and the
Party adopted Faure's metier advocating a pacif-l urse
abroad and cordemnin: adoration with the Communists at
home. The vote was f , to 1,700, an indication of the
prevailing mood in France. France thus became, rather
interestingly, the only democracy at that time with an
appreciable pro-Munich Left. On October 13 § the oureau
of the more moderate !?adical-Sccialista passed a declarat!
against the domestic and for policy of the Communis
The Popular Front was now indeed history. Only the Commun-
ists, the Left wing of the occialist Party, the C.G.T. and
7bid .
2?Micaud, o£, cit., p. 176.
cus, "Prance Under Oaladier, gf*j '"epublie,








6 minority of Radical-Socialists and traditional Nationalists
could be called &r By its unyielding atti-
e Communist Party lost a rreat number of the members
gained between ly34 l
In Mosc lie Munich agreement was viewed as a
prelude eitfc can coalition against the Scvi'.
•• to the granting to Germ&riy of a carte blanche in
the East.-' Le Journal de Koscow stated c: ober 4:
Zn effect France has with its own hands and without
hi consulted the VBSf, annulled the Sovlet-Cser
pact and one of the tent elements of a regional
ct.
. . . The loss of its allies and is©;
this is the price which France will have to pay for
c;v
'
for* the aggressor. 33
This statement was arreted by many as the Soviet method
of announcing the end of the ?ranco~3eviet Pact. Pari
however, was no ormed that this was, in fact, the
official ' attitude. •**
Daladier, having been accorded full powers on
bar >, seemed to be firmly cor »d that the Right was
now definitely more patriotic than the Left. He swerved
Ibid., p. " .
-*••**aric Sinaudi, Jean- Domenach sri Aid©
Carcsci, este.rn furore (Ithaca, r.T.
:
rersityTress , ] 9 ! 1)7 p.' ''- .
^Albrecht~C arris*, ©£. cit
. , p. 52:.
^ i in Frederick L. ochuman, "Fear, Fascism and
Appeasement, -vlet Foreign Policy , ed. Arthur
E. Adams (Benton: E C, Heath and Company, 1961} , p» 114.




InerMlingly to the Ri^ht.^ On October 21 blished
emergen
c
illations which abolished the fort • r wee
On ' §r 23 he sharply attacked the Communists.
ard the end of November, 193?. , France was hit by
a general strike in protest against the decree-laws of
Daladier, the revaluation old and the increased workir
hours. Daladier put the blame e Communists, who
doubt supported the strike but were not necessarily the sole
authors of it. Leon Jeuhaux, secretary of the C. . .
no Communist, was said to be the man most responsible.^
Daladier held firs and the general strike of November 30
collapsed in failure. This was yet another blow to the
influence and prestige of the Communist Party.
about this time t atior. , Genevieve Tabouis
saw some possible hope for the security of Europe through
the Franco-Soviet Pact. But, she wrote:
The new &nd militant attitude of the working masses
embarrassed the more r native supporters of the
alliance. e presence of the red fl#$ and the
resc -.trains of the ^International e at offi-
cial Bade the finlincie
l
rs7"tS
trial is ts, a- a aristocrats think that France was
movinr toward communism and that the Franco-Sovi
pact was the instrument which would brinf abc
SC revc~ . Ld all they o to dir-
er lliance, & a disfavor wi h»
English always viewed it; they m&dQ it impossible
3*Albert Guerard, France : jdem History
Arbor: The University of Fichigan Press, p. W
5<>Hobert Dell, "New Directions in r , Current
History, XLIX (January 19? c> ) , p.
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for the roveramect to straw. the- pac i-
tary or othar converse tic
icla went on to mention the fear of the conservatives
of bei sold to the Soviets*'' It jx out that the
pressure of big financier ular Front
nders to allow t ct tc a in!- into the lethargy in
which seejn uishc .
But I ad of mo i closer to the Russians, France
seemed to move e ^erma; . In December,
,
the German Foreign Minister came to ! aris a-
together with George B on December 6 I a Declar&-
ti: Prie more
than a general statement of good 5 1 good nei
borliness bet . 'rard
calls Lt it c piece of ©si - leva . leceived
no one. oter, Maurice Thorea called it 'the free
hand for any in the Fast. is doubtful that this
later accusal ior French press
did campaign shortly after the si of the document fcr
the formation of a Greater Ufcraine state under German
?




\r the text of this Declaration, see Dcgtar. and
^eter Jd§JL ... tjig.
TcrTT" ' ernationa" • I, pp~
"'uerard, ox- cit. , - .
Maurice Thcres, Four I'ttni aris: iltlona




The French Communist Party was again frustrated in
January, 1933, when Britain and France decided to recognise
th<- c rnment of General Franco. In the Chambers on Janu-
ary 2 . aledier's foreign policy won approval while
156 Socialists, 72 Communist s and M. de ferillis db sd.
On March 15 > , itler esta' ' • German
pn orate over Bohemia a' ravia* German troops,
followed by Hitler himself, had entered Pra former
capital of Caachoslovakia.
This titae, the reaction of the tfeato this move of
Hitler was different. Chamberlain was shocked and appalled
that Hit gentleman" and had gone bac
Although he had been an appeaser, Chamberlain did not like
bein£ "cheated," a Churchill put it.^ In Paris, the
French Communist Party, feeling that its opposition to
Minich had been vindicated, published an open declaration
criticizing the Daladier goverame
The .ols government ourht to forfeit 1
place to a true government of France, capable of
being respected, capable of defending its interest
and he :r. The French Communist Party calls upon
al2 to unite to fuarantee the security of the coun-
try and to save peace.
Without :fistir of political opinion or i
reli faith, Communist, Socialist crats,
Republicans, Catholics, Jews and Protestants ought
# lexer 1er Worth, Huasir ar 1941*19.4? ($•»
Torl< : Avon Books, 1964), p. $1.
^Churchill, pa, cit. , t. )UL.

nto rally together elbow to elbc
Let us imite to help France save the peace.
^
<ladier sought plenary powers to cope with the xsmt-
situation. The Communists virorously opposed this, but
Daladicr La powers by a vote of 321 to 264.
In Farch, the Soviet Government made a ir attempt
at collective security with the ',>:?. ^ed a
six-power conference of the na* *o3t directly involved
to consider this new Hitlerite aggression. The British
Government, however, rejected this an<i proposed instead the
publication of a joint Angio~Franeo~ Polish declaration
announcing the intention of the four to act jointly in case
of danger to any European state. ** n #arch 23 the Germans
occupied Kerne ,
The French Communists reacted by st r favori
nt action, especially between France, Great Britain and
the Soviet Union. I'Humanite headlined: "United, France,
USSft and Great Britain Ought to Inspire Confidence in All
aeed Peoples. *" But the democracies were not about to
listen to the Communists, either ir> France or the U.3.3.R.
Diplomatic intercourse continued between the three powers,
but on the part of Britain and France there was no urgency.
1939.
^Fror.t pare declaration \ 'umanlte , Karen 1?,
45Sews item in h'Bumanlte . March 19, 1939.
erth, Russia
,
At War, p. 43.
47L'Kumanite". Karch 26, 1939.
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It seems that at this point, talin took another look at
Litvinov's policy of collective security and found it lacV-
inf. For reasons known te3t to Stalin himself, he decided
to explore other means of coping with the German menace. To
implement this new policv he brought Viacheslav I'olctov to
tin i ovist Foreis-r Tfice.
III. r 7 km BIS PACT
It was on May 4, 1^3' , ti it itvinov resigned
Ccmmissar of Foreign Affairs and cleared the way for I cy
to assume the post. !*©lotov had been Premier (Chairman of
People's Commissars) and a member of the Politburo. One of
his first acts was to renew th* offer of a triple alliance
ainat Hitler to the British and French Ambassadors in
3Ccw. The Frerv this time were interested, but the
British still were not. Finally, however, Chamberlain agreed,
under pressure from the left and the tabor Pf•: to send a
special envoy to T'oacow. Tie was a Mr. William Strang, a
fcrei lev advisor of Chamberlain. His arrival marked
the feegi of prolonged negotiations on the issues of
direct and indirect aggression in Poland and the Baltic
states.
In Paris, L fHuman!te continued its campaign for t\
conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union. Be pe
ed the French readers on July 2:
madsky, c£. clt . , p. 3
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CuicHy! The Accord with the U.3.S.R. to save the
ace. In Dansip, there is an influx of ©•
Nasi troopa. But in Paris and in London, the Kunlchcis
are becoming the accomplices of the fascist aggres-
sor, slowly preparing for new capitulations. 4*r
On the following day: "ot a Second Munich But A Pact with
the USSP. On July 5 the paper cried, "Poland is in a
3tote of legitimate defense.' ^ And on the following day,
Gabriel Peri wrote, "The militarisation of Danzlr is the
beginning of aggression. »**
While negotiations in Moscow still dragged on,
Britain and Prance accepted the sur^estion on July 25 to send
their military and naval representatives to Moscow for tal*
The French Communists were in complete agreement. iy t
the Poet! read Gabriel Peri's column on August I.-'-* Two
days later, his banner read, *A Nasi Flan for the Encircle-
ment of Poland. n
*^
The Anglo-French military mission, no member cf
which could be considered a top representative, finaT
arrived in Vcscow on August 11. They possessed no written
formal powers to conclude a military converticr, much to the
dismay of iar Commissar 7oroshi3ov. He was likewise atr
49L'Humanlta , July 2, 1939.
^.'Kumanite . July 3, 1939.
5IlH?ufaanite , July 5, 193 >•
52Kditorial in L'Humanite , July 6, 3
53Edltorial in I'Humanlte . August 1, 1939.
iitorial in L'Hufflc...i te, August 3, 1939.

101
at the smallnesa of the planned British commitment on the
Continent to aid France. $5 The talks soon ran into diffi-
culties over the issue of Russian troops entering Poland and
the Baltic states in the event of a German attack upon them.
The British feared that this would open the way for the Red
/Lrmy tc walV intc furc-pe. Furthermore, both Poland and the
Baltic states refused to permit Soviet troops on their soil.
In the meantime, the Soviet Government had been
making gestures to Berlin on the subject of possible trade
agreements with Germany. By July, it appears that Hitler
had made up his mind to attecV Poland, and in the same month
the German and Soviet representatives began talks on a new
trade agreement. According to George Kennan, it was at this
point that the Germans, in private talks, began to pressure
the Bussians for an agreement which wot iye the U.3.S. .
aunity from involvement in any impending war in Eastern
Ttarcpe." On August 21, 1939, a trade agreement was signed,
while or the same eveninr it was announced that Cerman
Foreign Minister von Kibbentrop was flying to Koscow to sign
a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Ur.i
In France, the Communist Party was completely taVen
by surprise. According tc Jacques Fauvet, the French Com-
munists were both poorly informed and ill prepared for this
55Beloff, o£. dt .i L. T . , p. 2' .
56George P. Kennan , Ccyiet Foreign Policy 3__ ! Jhk




57turn of events.' The result was profound disagreement as
to the reaction to be taken by the Party. On the day follow-
ing the announcement of the impending pact, L ' :iumanite con-
tained not one editorial comment by Maurice Thorez, Jacques
Duclos or Gabriel Peri* Peri, it is said, stayed in his
office for three days, completely overwhelmed by the newr.
On September 23 » J 'Humanite finally made comment c
the forthcoming pact with the Nazis. Headlines read:
Success for the Soviet Folicy of Firmness, The Mos-
cow negotiations between the U3?K and Germany Serve
the Cause of Peace in Europe.
But then adde^), ithout further delay, Paris and Lonci
should sirn now the Franco-Anrlo-Soviet Pact. **
On the following day, the Communist organ noted that
oti&tions between Ribbentrop and T^olctov had opened but
pointed out that there was no rupture in the conversations
between the Soviet t nion and the British and French military
delegation. J
lead the talks with Britain and France were con-
tinuing, although the military mis^ic^s were still boshed
down over the intransigence of Poland and Rumania. It was




, r. zf .
5%id.
1Human! te. August 23, 1939.
^'Kewa item in I'Kufflanlte , / 24, 3 .
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military representative, had received a telegram from French
Premier Daladier who had been exertin/r strong influence on
the Polish Ambassador in Pari?. Ihe tele, ram, in effect,
gave General Doumenc the authorization tr g* ahead and si;
a military convention and tc af ree to the undert; on
Fcland's behalf. The Polish Government had not authorised
this and, in fact, three days later indicated that it did
net eni we or spree.* The Soviet Government did not
accept General Ooumenc's commitment Kmt rather insisted
a direct authorisation from Poland and Rumania. This was
rthecminf and on the ni^ht of Aueust 23, 1939 » the
Soviet Government signed the -ron-A^f:ression Pact wi
Germany. It was published to the world the following day.
t'Rumarite had written this for publication on
August 25:
We are in favor of resistance to all acts of arerea-
sicn and the Communists ©re ready to fulfill their
duties as Frenchmen in the framework of the enleve-
ments contracted by their country. Tf Pel and i
attacked, the treaty with her must come into play.
But the French public did not read it because publication of
L *
H
uman!ts was suspended by decree law on August 25 and the
edition was seised. On the same day, Britain proclaimed a
formal treaty with Poland while both French and British
rsrnttsnta made all preparations for war as Germany in-
creased her measure on Poland. The French Communists were
sloff, c£. cit. , Vol. II, pp. : - '1.
Editorial in L » Human!te . August 25, 1939.

confused. After years of campaigning for resistance to
tlerlte Germany, the Soviet-Naai Pact was not viewed as
a change in the fundamental conflict with fascism. Party
leaner ? aurice Thorez, in a communique issued on the same
day as I f Htjnanite'a suspension, stated that the people of
France were united. Indeed, the Communists would be in the
front rank in the struggle against Germany if Hitler were to
<msh war. Furthermore, he said, the Communist Party
approved the measures tafcen by the government to safe
the frontiers and to bring aid, if necessary, to Poland, the
ally of France* As for the Soviet-German Pact, it was
simply a device of Stalin to fracture the aggressors (Germany,
Italy and Japan) , hitherto united under the Anti-Comintern
Pact.
ortly after the Soviet-Nazi Pact was signed, semi-
ricial sources in Germany stated that the Franco-Soviet
Pact was incompatible with the Soviet*Nasi Pact and therefore
was no longer in force. On August 2$ the French Ambassador
in Moscow, M. tlaggier, w?s informed by the arnment
that the Franco-3oviet Pact of 1935 had already been rendered
null and void by the Franco-German '"Non-Aggression Pact of
December 6, 193?. So ended the Pact which b have
^%ews item in the Hew York 2Lmes, it 26, 3
See also Fauvet . cit . , p. ^'-2. This same tacF was echoed
by Parcel Cachin Tn an open letter to I ecn Plum. See
Beleff, ££. cit., Vol. II, p. 2f7.
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setting off the spark which igmited World War II. The French
Communist Partv continued to maintain its r.ationalirtic and
patriotic outlook. On the same day that Hitler unleashed his
war machine, the Party passed a resolution welcomir
riot-German Pact but also favoring aid to Poland. w -' 1
September 2, the Party's parliamentary rrcup voted with the
rovernment for war credits, enthusiastically applaud!*
Daladiar's moving patriotic speech. On the following di
Britain, followed by France, ieclared war on Germany. Dala~
dier was riven additional plonary powers to implement the
war effort.
In the days which followed the Communis ta answered
faithfullv their call to active duty with the militarv.
Even Thorez reported on September 3 tc his unit.^ Parcel
Cechin assured Leon Klsm in an open let? er?
We were the first to proclaim the necessity of mak li
every -acrifice to stril zism.
shall not cease to proclaim it. fa receive our
mots i'ordre only from the French people
3e3off, loc. cit.
^Fauvct, c£. cit., pp. 255-
1
>7Clted in Beloff, loc. cit., and Maurice Ceyrat,
1 ft Politique Puss.e et le Pgrti Communist
e
Francois 1920* <
ITaris , 1'*.' '6)
, p . '-. ' 7
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For some re* the French Ccomunist Party was not
aware that Moscow viewed the war between Germany, on the-
hand, and France, Britain and Poland, on the other, as an
iperlalist war. later t ana autumn, the Party was
accused of not realizing tho communist a ve
events of , . They were , I wrenp for not
recomizir^ a imperialist^ war, for voting military credi
for not protesting against th* reaction* licies of
Daladier, for f*y>et:' of collective security and mutual
assistant From every indica* the French Ccmrauni
?arty was n f aware of Moscow's change of attitude
•ard Germany until the middle of f-sptsnbsr,
pteraber 17, the Red Array invaded Poland
from the east on the pretext of eontrt % chaos in Polar-
and prever/ -acution of ti sh minority in
• eastern j red ccur This time
the Party seemed prepared. On the dav following the invasion
by the Bussians, the Central Committee of the French Par'
acclaimed the liberation of the Ukraine i -elorussia.
that) it took aim at France. The French state had rone t
war, thev charred, wit3 It consent of Pari laser '-is
Farty therefore demanded the con of the Chambers to
examine the peace proposition of tho Soviet Uhicn.
Henceforth, the Coamuni enounced ?rance and Britain as




fcmentors cf the war" and openly endorsed the Russian
aslon of easterr Poland, It was also at this time that
eevcral Cosimunist leaders, inr rez, deserted their
units. »® /ithin the period of a few weeks, the uncompro-
mising bellirerency of the Partv turned to uncompromising
pacifism. The Party wh: : ad been praising Poland for its
resistant attitude, which twd praised England and France for
the guarantees to Poland, which had been insis on an
alliance with the Soviet Union to prct* nd, now referred
to Poland as that prison of the peoples, that multi-
national state, tat artificial creation of Versailles/
and called the war cf Britain end France against Germany
>!
not a way cf the people, rut cf high finance*"
Tncres later turned up in w* After the war,
he returned to France, was ?
gave hira a post in the re^r-war cabinet, Inore at remained
active in the leadership of the French Communist Party until
ly 12 i 3
71 x
r.dre **arty, nhe Trip.' French
feputies (London: Lf>urr--nce and r ;Tisharr, LtaT] 1941), p, 1 .
t is Sot Inown for certain why the Party was not aware of
lin's intentions to make a pact * the Germans but it
is clear that w': ' . the French Cc-mra*. B were t . by
sur st, they were prepared for the events of
that tber. Fauvet claims that the task of convir
the Party he soundness of "esc:-.;* 2 actle
was the worV of ' the Comintern represents' a
Ceed m as ' Clem-..-it . e Fin ££. cit . , p, 2 i;-
ser author, 'Ifred Richer, Ct alin axyl the French Commun-
ist >!,. .r ( aw CcluabTa University r'ress,
, -eys r.hat the complete volte-face of the French
list Party can he from date of
be French Communist, ynt, from
Kcscow with new instructions for the Part .

li
7he complete shift of I arty was too much for some
of Its members ar.d Its friends. By the end of wo
Dties resimed from the Parfcv, to be followed
in September by ere 8 i General Confederr of
labor condemned the Scviet-K<a?i Pact and, after the events
of September, i off its relations with the- Party. I-
laboraticn," said the labor organisation, is no longer
asible with those who wouli net Of could not condemn such
an attitude which denies the principle ;umaine sclidar
which are the honor of cur labor movement. •*
'Hie French Communist Party did not have lonr to
proclaim its new stand, frr or I eptember 26, • Party
was banned by decree-law. Within the wee- >/ed the
se v -two C. 1st i tat and two Senators were exrei:
from Parliament because of the Party's he
"imperialist war. '* The ws classed later In eland'
tinely published material, was the fault of men like Daladier
t. en proclamation, the Communist Par 1
leveled Iti char
We accuse the Daladier- of having sa* -
taged the Fr nnce Pact whi'
was an «c ,ntee -ace and securi*
for our count r- . ?e accuse them of having systems'-
Ically rejected and brought to i curht the repeated
auvet, cr_. at&« . pp. 25U t 25 .
_id.
, p. W
7" t ?rc- Lata/ Ilv: :
CCO (Julv 3 ; .-.i)
, p. ^y , and Karty, gg. cit.

proposals of th -iet Union for the
of eollftjBtlvt security and peace, an ov ^ople
3d. • 5
The Pr*r.ch Communist Far' nearly
nineteen years with t ,ird French Republic, For near
• last four years of its life before its official nannish-
ment, the Tarty had striven n of
France a 'iet Union asralnst Germany er enhar
the position of the democracies again* t fasc . In its
rG&r-B! J-a->alf , it strove in vain to effect an alii*
oviet Union and the old Entente Cordis"
failed. And after fai; rned Uie F.v
ernment and the French pan la.
75Andre Marty, Who Betray ancg {: ew York:




The French Communist Party in the latter Nineteen
thirties was indeed an influence on the foreign relations
of the French Republic, but not directly and not in the
positive sense. The presence and strength of the Party
contributed significantly and inadvertantly to the weak-
ness of French leadership during this period.
The growing strength of the French Communist Party
la the mid and late 1930 »s was not the result of efforts
by Moscow but was rather the result of French backwardness
in social legislation, and a dislike on the part of some
Frenchmen for the fascism and national socialism of Musso-
lini and Hitler. The Communist Party had a firm policy for
social reform and for maintaining peace. The French work-
ing class was in favor of both and many of them saw in the
noisy Communists a group which might possibly accomplish




The position of the Communist Party on various
foreign policy issues during these years would appear
in hind-sight to be noble and commendable. They were
in favor of an alliance between France and the Soviet
Union. They were against the relntroiuetion of conscrip-
tion in Germany. They were against Laval's policies of
accommodation with Germany and Italy. They were
opposed to Laval's tolerance of the fascist leagues*
Ihey condemned Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia. They
gave their support to the Soviet Government for the rati-
fication of the France-Soviet Pact. They complained of
French inaction when Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland.
lh© elections of the Spring of 1936 gave the
Communists seventy-two seats in the Chamber of Deputies
but although the Communists were part of the victorious
Popular Front coalition, they chose not to participate in
the Government. The Civil War, which began in Spain only
a few months after the Popular Front took the reins of
power in France, was the first crushing defeat, by impli-
cation, for the Communists. Gradually at first, but
increasingly as the months passed, the Communists sought
to strike down the fascist-supported forces of General
France, they were completely unsuccessful.
Hitler's annexation of Austria brought another
call for action from the Communists but France did nothing.
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A* the Hitlerian threat moved east toward Czechoslovakia,
the Party pledged their support to the Czechs as the
Soviet Union unsuccessfully called for an anti-Nazi Front,
The Party begged British ana Trench leaders to reject
Hitler's demands upon Czechoslovakia and heaped shame upon
those men who met at Munich. In that last sad year before
Hitler invaded Poland, it was the French Communist Party
which called so often for the defense of Poland and the
formation of an Anglo-France-Soviet Alliance to stop the
march of Hitler in Europe. The alliance never was formed
and World War II was fought in Europe to crush the ever-
expanding power which was Hitler's.
Ihe French Communist Party was clearly a complete
failure in foreign policy during this era. Its desires
rarely saw fulfillment. Why? Because, first and obviously,
the Communist Party was not strong enough to impose its
will upon the Government. And secondly, because the
Communist Party was strong enough to cast fear into the
hearts f its political opponents so as to make these
opponents shun any course of action favored by the Com-
munists.
The Communist Party in France was radical; it was
noisy; it was militant. It openly admired a foreign power
which since the Revolution of 1917 was sorely distrusted
and despised by the majority of Frenchmen. The Communist

113
Party in 1934*1935 suddenly stole the anti-German thunder
away from the right-wing Frenchmen who, in their attempt
to disassociate themselves from the Communists, forced
themselves into becoming pro-German and pro-Nazi. We have
seen that the parties of the left, notably the Socialists
and the Radicals, in their anti-fascist seal and in the
hope of righting the social disorders of France, formed
the Popular Front with the Communists* But the coalition
lasted, for all practical purposes, for only eighteen
months. One of the main reasons for its lack of success
as a Front of the Left was that the Communists were such
disreputable bed-fellows. Socialists and Radicals found
themselves embarrassed too much and too often by the
Communists. Whether they desired it or not, the Communists
were identified with the terrible wave of strikes in
France, with the atrocities of the Spanish Reds, with the
Russian purges, with dying for Danzig and finally with
the Soviet-Nazi Pact. Their advocacy of Soviets every-
where, even to the display of a flag for a Soviet France,
was too much to tolerate. As a result, even the French
Left had to move Right to stay clear of the Communists.
This was the real influence of the French Communist Party-
anti-Ccmmunist forces of all political descriptions were
forced to the Right, and gave the Third French Republic a
foreign policy which was not only Rightist but so anti-
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Communist that it became an appeasing, weak, Ineffectual
policy which relied upon Great Britain for complete
guidance.
Jean-Marie Domenach, in his essay on French
Communism makes a most interesting comment about the
French Communist Party in the post-World War II days
of the late 1940 ? s. He states that communism and anti-
communism divided France in such a way that anti-
communism, 'by a sort of internal logic moves progressing-
ly toward the right.' Then he adds:
The dialetic of Communism and anti-Communism
- makes impossible the existence of a non-Communist
left which will not be absorbed by the Communist
Party or forced toward the right, this dialectic
has greatly facilitated the Communist party's
effort to monopolize the forces of the left,
2
True! And in the same manner, it appears that the French
Left of the late 1930 »s recoiled from the communists and
advocated or tolerated policies of which they otherwise
might not have dreamed.
It seems reasonable, theri, to make this assump-
tion: if the Communist Party in France during the years
1934-1939 had been insignificant, then-.
Marie iiinaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach and Aldo
Garosci, Communism in Western ^.urope (Ithaca, 8.Y.:





1. The French nationalists would have
continued to be nationalists to the
consternation of Hitler.
2. The French conservatives would have re-
mained conservative, but they would have
been deprived of their anti-Left ammuni-
tion supplied by the vocalizations and
machinations of the French Communist
Party. Some conservatives would have
chosen fascism as a solution to domes*
tic problems, but on the other hand,
fascism would not have been supposed
as the only alternative to the com-
munist threat.
3. The French Centre could have recognised
the wisdom of domestic social reforms
in France. Ifoey would not have con-
fused social justice with surrendering
to the Communists to the extent that they
did.
4. The French Radical-Socialists could have
found more common ground with the 3.F.I.O.,
unembarrassed by the Communist association.
5. The Socialists under Leon Blum, could
have enjoyed more respect, more confidence
from the French people. They could have
adopted a policy of aiding the Madrid
government without fear o£ fasclst-or
Rightist-inspired Insurrection in France.
Or, their pacifist beliefs could have
permitted them to adopt the policy of non-
intervention without apologizing for it.
6. The Popular Front coalition could have
adopted a firm policy toward Germany;
could have taken seriously and strengthened
the Pact with Russia. The coalition
could very well have relied upon Great
Britain for the lead in foreign policy
but it would not have had to bear the
burden of pleasing the Tories by frus-
trating their own Communists associates.

116
The foreign policy of the French Republic would
have been different if the Communist* had been weaker, if
they haa been less import ant.
I. FAILURE OF THE FRAKCC-30VTET PACT
The Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance is a
prime case in point which deserves special attention.
This pact was born of fear of Germany on the part of both
France and the Soviet Union. 1fce Pact was clearly anti-
German. Litvinov's policy of collective security and
France's desire for a complete alliance system which would
hold Germany in perpetual check set the conditions for a
renewal of the old Franco-Russian Alliance. Although the
Pact of 1935 was no real substitute for an Eastern
Locarno, it was »emi as the seed which could possibly grow
into something which could take the place of an Eastern
Pact. The Soviet Onion sought to become the ally of the
greatest power in Europe and hence deter German aggression,
while the France of Louis Barthou sought to gain Soviet
assistance, render the revival of Rapallo impossible,
and bolster her Polish and Czech allies. But Barthou did
not live to make this an instrument of French foreign
policy. In the critical years between his death and World
War II, the Quai d'Oraay was occupied by men, like Laval,
Delbos and Leger who did not look to a Russian connection
of the vigorous type.
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The Franco-3oviet Pact of 1935, the work of
the nationalist and conservative that was Barthou,
could perhaps have prevented World War II if the Pact
had been firmly applied and implemented by both parties.
From all indications the Russiam took the Pact rather
seriously. The Soviet Union warned repeatedly between
1935 and 1939 that if the West failed to take advan-
tage of Moscow* s willingness to collaborate in the
organisations of collective security, it might soon be
too late. It was France who chose to make the Pact weaker
than the Russians had hoped and who refused to take mean,
ingfu! and concrete steps to give the Pact the strength
and power to deter Hitler.
But France hesitated and nothing was ever done
to make the Pact a strong connection, even in the mili-
tary sense. There were several reasons for this. First
of all it must be admitted that France, from the days of
Barthou and Laval, had been striving for links with
Italy as well as Russia. After the Abyssinian crisis
shattered the Franco-Italian detente of 1935, France was
left with Russia alone, and this state of affairs tended
to be rejected by latent French prejudices against Russia.
Secondly, Britain was never enthusiastic over the Pact.
France constantly feared that any strengthening of the

Pact might be viewed by Britain aa a violation of Locar:
and cause a British withdrawal from it. The growing power
of the French Communist Party increased British sus-
picion* and led the French Government to reaist endanger-
ing the British guarantee. And finally, it was the sur-
prising gains made by the Communist Party in 1936 which
scotched the chances of making the Pact a powerful instru-
i ment of deterrence or punishment.
It has been mentioned that the presence of the
Communist Party in such strength tended to drive all
political factions further to the right, It seema also
to be true that anything associated with the Communists
became tainted or infected with the stench of communism.
To a large degree, this is what happened to the France-
Soviet Pact. Such a Pact in the handa of conservatives
roused the suspicions of only a few. But in the hands of
a Popular Front Government which owed such a large
degree of support to the Communists, such a Pact was al-
most intolerable aa a scrap of paper, much less aa a
Pact strengthened by military conventions. For this
reason, the French Foreign Office and the French
Government after 1936 chose not to broach the matter. The
Communists were enough trouble already.
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root of this division.
Blum, Leon. rFrance and Non-intervention,' Current
History
.
XLIX, November 1933, pp. 26-39.""
Blum*s view of intervention in Spain
by Italy and Germany and his reasons for
continuing the official policy of non-
intervention.
Brown, Francis. * Premier Laval Has His Troubles'
Current History, XLIII, December 1935, pp. 311-314.
rather unfavorable article on Laval f s
policies and possible fascist leanings.
-A Drama of French Politico,' Current History
,
XLIV, April 1936, pp. 64-b. .
An account of the ratification of the
Franco-Soviet Pact by the French Chamber^.
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Crotch, V. Alter. -France Outbluffed," Current History,
TLV, October 1936, pp. 65-7 .
An account of the first week* of the
Popular Front Government and the author's survey
of the foreign policies of Laval, Barthou,
Leger and Blum.
Current ry_, January 1^. 34- September 1 . .
.
Useful nev/a items are available in tht
pages which have aided in a
for the period as well as verifying histori-
cal fac
Daladier, >: uard. Mot Cede a Foot of Lanl,
al Speeches
. . 3-7, April 15, 1919*
The Premier's tr.?adcast of 29 Starch
to the people of France and of ;orld
France* a reaction to Italy's demands in the
Mediterranean*
*'France fetplalne Its Position' , Vital Speeches ,
:6-9, Oc I 15, 193 .
ttladier defends the Runic! m
4 October 1936 before the Chamber of lea.
Dean. Sdgar Packard. 'The rreneh Charter,
Poj^Jgn ' &§» 14|706J , -hii-.- 1936*
Gives the br m of tfe 3-6 Chanter
Deputies as well as an
cleaning of the Popular Front victory. Che
thor insists that France, as a result of
I more t he
ited States was permanently Jemocratic as a
result of Roosevelt's election in 1932.
i3ell, Robert. *9*m Directions is France, : >-
tor;., XIII, January
. U
A rather comprehensive review of French
affairs since 1936 with an attempt, to minimis*
the influence of the French Communists as the
cause of France's ills.
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Dean, '/era Klelu . truggle for Security,
'
Foreign Policy Reports , 11 j£6- ae 19, 1935.
A 1935 look at the just-signed Fran • - ^viet
Pact atual Assistance.
her, Louis. La Moves Toward Dew
,
Current History, XLII, "leptember 1915 f if-. - Z**9*
An interesting article by a. r^rver who
La clearly impressed by the liberalizing t]
in the "oviet U:. -4-35.
''Flight From the Coramuni.. I*a, : Living A^e
. 35#: 457-6, J
translation from an article in
La Luglier
e
, a Paris Left-Liberal Weekly, con-
cerning the about-face of the Fr Communist
Party between August and October 1939.
Fumlsa, <^if;ar S, * Patriot ism Coraes to the Soviet»,
Current History
,
ill I, J^ly 1935, V. ,.>-—*1.
This author is also Inpreaei t tff thi
le*eaph>ela o Id revolution as
international unity of the *orld proletariat.
Gallicus. 'France <r Jaladier , New Repallic
,
99:327-8, July 26, 193 -
The author views jaladier as attemj-
to resist Hitler by fasciaing France a
destroying* French liberties by using the war
:are.
Geraiui, Anare. ' France, Hussia and the Pact utual
tance,' Foreign Affairs , 13:226-35, January !'
A study of the negotia which even-
tually led to the signing of the pa
Gittler, L.F. ''France Finds a Huey Lonf;, : :.n^nt
rv , IL/, April 1937, pp. 6i-2.
- article on Jac ues Deriot, the ex-






, ..lbert. The French Bourgeois aod Joamunism, 7
Ifti
/lew
, mil, So. 3, Hard 33, rp # 557-67.
A sympathf : ruatment of the CoBaauni
Party in the Popular Front era. According
tutfa i , he Communists were faithful
ting the government, law and order,
Hughes, Banuoiph. the Present Conflict of
t^talti 1 The V ine t eenth Century , {675*704,
December 1935.
Concerns Fre .he It
Aby.»siar. .ii sputa, especially the view of the
Fight.
Laval, Pierrv . -»nce and tl ^,
Viti. ^ches, 2:5-6, stoker 7, 1925.
Lava.; *i Speech at Geneva in which he
regret full/ agree* to back Britain agaii
.
.Ml 1 ini * s Jth i apian auvant ore
.
Maur ;is, Andre. ' Pfcrad . .. ; . .ch Coasau rrent
History, XLIX, IJ;>vember 19 3#, pp. 27-*2.
• author attempts to explain why French-
men vot & Coaaau;. . jr are
hardly Incline -ware that .In
h: Lew, the iiti.. BRKtt&la
. that the representatives woul i se-
duced by the "big people" in Paris.
£ HejDublic, 6*8: 26V-7 , ,tober 14, 1936.
A dlaettsaJ f the Spanish Civil »ar
crisis as it affected the Popular front a
the Cntiwmnlata in particular.
Philip, Andre\ ifting 3ta
Foreign Affairs, 1?*740*52, July ' o .
•a the sit-aowr. strikes of 1 {,
ana the status of ths French working class in
the late lv 3. *e«
SJjecnda, k H. . Yoar 1 * tannic loaaey,"
urrent History , XLIII, January , . 345-52.

at ouomary of in -i-
r the year 1935. Points u] that French
latintrayiTiflM r e only Idly by while
power - fr.m their hands?
.
, Joha "Leon Blum, -Jar-rent f>ist ory P XLI
August 1936, pp. 62-4.
A ..the tic treatment of Blum's fir
m rnths in office
.
Tabottis, Genevi That Frafi - viet Pact,
U*tll5~7.
A thoughtful stu-iy an why Fran
strengthen her co&naction .ath the '.'. '. .R.
Webb, Barton, ;*al: French Style, 1 ' horrent
History, XL?!, Ju . 37, pp.
rather glowing account of the first year
Blun'^ .' -eroment with -ho note that at
least two years rfill be re t&lrad bef:. m
can effect the MUUry raeasur 1
.... Laglslatl >n.
Werth, Alexander. ' French Fascism," Foreign Affairs
,
L5j L41-54, et ber 1936.
Da mature of the ft*SS 3t leagi-
and U. or«#
thera. The auth 1 ia S nsider the Leagues a
iger • 1 but. the Communists.
. Ilia ft - - in Difficulties,
yoriUg Affairs. o:6uB-28, July 1937.
.mmenta on the "Banna initiated by Blum





: M. Chauteaps Cries '• >lt\ Carre; /£»
XLV1II, Karen 1936, pp. 24-26.
rsra the fall of Chautem^s* Government
>B and Blum's attempts at forslEtg a




After the Popular Fr nt, 1 Foreign .glair^,
17:U— -. jB.
*erth reviews the ace on I i £ the
Popular Front G 1 rentur j say
bour . . aa
afraiu of the Front Populalre aa lh- re
ra before.
i. New ra
The jjgw York Timea, February ,~~ ptember
IV. ^TUDIiO ra &EB after the period
i. Jipioaatlc History
Albrecht -Carrie, Rene. Franc e
,
re and the Two rid
ara . ftew York: Harper And Brothers, 1vol.
An excellent account: >f Baey between
the wara, with emphaaia on the rv>ie f Franco
hvr gradual decline t:v that 9t being the
object a? pressures from without.
.
Ji pi ocatic I-;ia t-.>ry of . -^
resa of Vienna . New York: Harper and Row,
Publiahera, Inc., IS
A rec igi.iaed, comprehensive text. »£ pean
diplomatic history which waa uaei aa a general
reference text la tfei preparation of thia thesis.
Carr, Sdward Hallett. German- ? rviet Eela,
th< >rld -ara
, 1919-3 . . 3*11 I The
Joana Boj&laa Praas, 1951
»
A useful text for cr ..^-referencing events
in France with thoae reiatioi-a between Germany
and the Soviet Union.
International Relatione Between th*







of the intar-war ptricu which was used fre ue;-
in the pre; oration >f the thesis to mait a
general picture of the historical motl in tl
Craig, Gordon A. ft&d Felix Gilbert | i. The llplp«
cat a !v.'--. .-}]... 2 vols. ' iw York: Athene urn,
-.63.
17 .tain some two dozen eaaays
.he major -ign policies f
. :ajor states curing the inter-war pari
Particularly useful were the studies >& I.itv.. i ,,
Lager and Coulondre.
Efeylor, a.J.F. flhe Origins jf the Second -ar .
Greenwich, QoBft«i Fawcett Put Ilea' i.
which dafilaa that Hitler had a i
icoiv-. i ..„:.<? but
simply actea bo and successfully as events
unfolae . »ex mm useful as a background
for thia la that it ; _y
that statesmen are too absorb*. a to
conceive a system.
2* French History and French C:;,oanunisr3
Atkinson, Littleton fi, 1st Influe:.. ; French
Rearmament . * jocumeutary Research Stviaioa,
search tudiaa Institute, Air 'Jniveraity,
.'-•5.
This paper is a stuuy ;f the c to-
French rearmament in the 195'"- f 3 but it containa
an exes. ; analysis on 'why Fro r
tfith t.hc French Communist Party,
Cameron, Elizabeth B« ¥~r Oogue to Appeasement . hashing.
ton: American Council on Public Affair^, 1942.
An excellent, study of French foreign policy
and an indictment against French fascists and
proto*faaciata became the dupes of Hitler.

Cathala, Jea;,. raying Peace. Moscow;
Literature
tdly wri by a COJW1
to Communion, iis a pitiful, yet unintentional -
hui rib^ . - i ilanlaai as It cad -
in Ft-.. war. According t thia text,
; m 1 I and
Hitler int Land, An . .a. Lou.
Bart; . . ,iily c .- I . ...
Fr from 1934 until a_ ar.
*_.£, javi . Coegauniaa an*i the French Intallectua
O. T!3W Yi The Macadllay any,
Primarily a study of the attraction f
.*anch int a . aJU
wera useful $ b tevelo] -
la,
Ceyrat, Kauric , La Politique aae et Parti
muni.. . ;air 1>2-* -v>-,4£ . Parias tt, ,
,
ctivv y f C.ramunism in Frai.ce
a twenty~i ;-oar period,
ihe year- L934—
3
. I in twenty-.,
pages,
Cole, Hubert. Lava A Sioffrarhy. Fir at American
e, . mt York; (i.P. Putnam *a , 5.
A fairly 1 .at the
toraial Laval.
Fauvet, Jac Hlstoin anunijsy; Fra; j
2 v L~. : Librairie Artheme Fayar
iume j. is a coapr< ;t
history of the Party from 1917 to 1$35 . la
text was of the utmost vaiut
thi,* theaia.
,nf l&rxi A. i Lnog _'_,.. Haw Torkj iarper
•+.
A
insights int : the I a.
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Trard, Albeit. Franc* : ^ Modern History, An* .a-tor:
The University >f Michigan Press, 1V59.
This author gives no sympathy to the Frm
Right for their conduct, curing the pre-war
pe. i&ile he attributes little
blame t L*t*«
Herte . . .
,
. . ... Lence f-'arxistc; en } i
Iy36-.iv38. Pario: Sditlon* K, Th. (tenia,
Thlss author states that the presence of a
large Communist delegation during the late 19
created a terrible danger for France. By divi U
ing the h energies, by turni; u .
against themselves ana by systematic excita
the Communists brought nothing but frustration
to Fran .
Howard, John aidreu. Parliament and Foreign Policy in
France . London: The Cresset Press, 194&«
A small section f this text treats the
peri er study. The author eapJiasik.
the influence ^f internal politic* and the
reliance upon Great Britain in the determina-
m of French foreign : :y during the
riod.
In ?earch S France . Center for Inter i I nal affair*,
.rvaru. Univer. C«aferldg*| Harvard University
Preow, 1963.
UCcallant collection of essays on France.
ipacially useful was Joau-Bapti. le'a
&angt -'sign Policy Since 1945
1
which contained an excellent intr
ing the rea^ . the fall of franc* x 1 .
Hicaud, Charles .. The French Right a raany
lV
j f
33~lvJV> Kaw lork: Octagon a
,
Inc., 19o4.
»..,... uiiy j ubiishe .3 by Juke Uni-
versity, this ... trillar.t . f of the
French Right sn^d bow they became y.-ro-fasci.
and pro-Hitler at the a f French oscurity
jauss they were *a frightened by Communlam,




Rieter, Alfred J. i in and the French CoBEiunist Party
1_ . c; Columbia University Press,
Although this author has written jrimarily
on. ever. t to Hltler*s invasion of
Russia, hia summarit events lea to this
-ite are excellent. Likewise, he makes some
poi^nai. the frustrations of
the French Communist Party to satisfy their
m national desires in the face of contrary
ii i from Moscow during the post-war
It is believed that the Party h*.
lar fru»trat fore the rf^
* L P^^uniat fai-ty Trans, and ed.
llmoore Kendall, flew Raven: Yale University P:
1947.
An excellent treatment of the French Communist
Party 193 - out also containing a summary
of Coaer activit roa Munich to Hitler
f Russia,
3aur^~, »« et Guy Lat i . Agonie I* ^a v5~
gjh, : Libraire Flan, 1942.
anti-^ovict and p - -^fay account of why
France behav. m die one war-.
illia; rana. Alliance Against Hitler. Jurhara,
. : . : Duke University Preas, 1962.
A detailed and scholarly account of the France-
..2 and 1935 which c have been
written in 1936 aa it oak*. I effort to tie the
pacts in with the- tragic eve f the following
three year^.
Jhirer, William L. g itury
,
Journey. Sew * Farrar,
Straus and Young, 19>2.
The future autl . f Tm Rise and Fall of




Bon, Yvco R. The Roaa iTioJar 191&«lft3< . Trans.
-Jauow ^. Corbett and George J.
York: Sheed an +2.
Lctment of the French Right which
ath«rred the thought that; a vic-
enemies of France could be at the same time a
nrlet Ruasla.
Thores, Maurice. Pour L
;
. Parii>: . .,icna
3eclalea
s 1949.
A I it -war French Communist publlca
which includes an atrevlated Communist ver~
of why France dedined ii the years before the
ter, Gerard. gjatoi I Parti Cotamuniate Francais
.
Pari^: *imery Scwojr/, 1946.
A fr: / treatment of the French Communist
Party but ii is no* particularly deta: for
the h»X939« lu excellent chronology
peri. . given at the back of the book.
Wiliard, Geraaine. La drole da Guerre et La Trahi>.
Vichy. Pari**; Litiona Socialea, I960,
An aft er-t he- fa et , Communi at versi
!
French foreign and domestic affairs which 1
a feat at the hands of Germany.
Zevaes, Alexandre. Blstoirc ialisai et du Comm-jniaae
en France de IB71 a 1947 . Paris; gditiona
France-Jopire, 1^7.
A comprehensive study &f Socialism a . m-
munism in France over a period of three- .uartera
itury. Coverage of the 1934-1939 period
is rather brief.
3 • Foreign Relations and History of the UJ
iidams, Arthur :,. (e..;. .*-.* .vgs in reign
icy . Boat or, : J.C. Heath,' 196l7
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Frederick L. 3chffiun*a article give^
in ing it wiet




j& for%i&h\ filter. ut :^>yX&- ?-y*fXt
a .<•-*-. 2 v,!-.. London: Oxford Uni . Lty
Pre»4, 1947-49*
A well annotated and objective work on
Soviet Foreign policy ax II.
Both voluaea were particularly . e-
paring this theala.
oaran, Anthony Trawick. 3oyi
e
t Foreign Pol i cy ;
attern of fer*. rdhas
^veraity Press, Yyol
.
racted confli ,ype study of
viet foreign
| / which oraws freely from
-Wats ra a id Borkena . I a author la
the alia began t sov<
a pro-German oriantatioa shortly after AnachI :
! Blum';* aaaond reaignatio .
Cattail, javi .. Soviet -jiplomacy and th Jh
Civil t.'ar . Berkeley: University af Cai- ^a
Pre^s, 1957.
A relatively recent aa .aia'a
involvement in the war arly
useful to this writer in studying
the envalvecjent of France in that conflict.
Vei :y. George. & Hi / of Ruaaia. Fifth edit!
M Haven: Yale University Praaa, 1961.
I accepted and reliable te*t on the history
,ia from anti uity. 1 in this atudy
as backgr I ba.aic reference.
th, Alexander. Russia At r-ar 19^1*194^ . : :
Avon Books, 1965.
After apa&dtsg yaara in France, Reporter
werth went to the Soviet Union where he spent
the war. The introductory pages of this work
help fill Lht< gap in J -..anding France-
riat relations immediately prior t . war.
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Icenan* Fra.. . miaunism. New Ycrk:
Harpers ana Brothers, 1953.
A we. o amended §j Aranatl - iy of
Communism la Europe, The author concludes .!
the Fre. Lata bega^ ao early •
shuck off their . . jiatiou with the Prei
Left ana deliberately aoygnt to achieve
with the Right: the army, the bv
a b Lutocracy who coulc
a real pact with the- U. . v . and v with
Gerssany
.
Oattell, Javid, ?. CoBrnuniam anc thu Spaniah Civil ^ar.
Berkeley: University ;f California Pre^-i, 1955.
The author *s earlier w^rk on the ish Civi
Likewise \X in examining the involv
merit of i ,
Einaudi, Marie, Je«. menach, an tel«
st ern durope . Ithaca, W.T.i Cornell
University fetes, 1951.
Three a I by the three author The essay
he French Communist Party- by J M -




Bter, William Salmi in. History of the 'foree Ir.t
nationals . Sew International Publishers,
55.
American Communist I gives his inter-
•ition t* Inter Hale,
MeKenzie, Kermit 1, Comlntei- tforli ,-luti
w York: Columbia ynlveraity Frees, 1964.
A recent study of the workings, mostly
prest lay, of the Comintern.
Mollau, Gunther. Interaati .omaunlsm W
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l ry < -.-rid Cyggiunian , wick
.
. Fraeger, 1953.
Good coverage on the Popular Front tactic
Communism and ita experiene Franc t
,
author concludes that Stalin would have achj
more unity an aaalstt if the
extra-Russian Communist parties la have
solved themselv«£. uch voluntary ti-
tlon woul w of valuable ex-
perience ne*d@a later.
United 3tates Corigr«wo, House of Representative
Committee on Un-American activities. The Com-
munist C racy : -ategy a
Coismunioia. -ashington: Government Printing
ffic<
, 1956*
Part I, Section , Communist Activiti*
Around the aina many selected cita-
tions fro© texts otherwise difficult to obtai





